From Low-Distortion Norm Embeddings to Explicit Uncertainty Relations
  and Efficient Information Locking by Fawzi, Omar et al.
AFrom Low-Distortion Norm Embeddings to Explicit Uncertainty
Relations and Efficient Information Locking
OMAR FAWZI and PATRICK HAYDEN, McGill University
PRANAB SEN, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
The existence of quantum uncertainty relations is the essential reason that some classically unrealizable
cryptographic primitives become realizable when quantum communication is allowed. One operational
manifestation of these uncertainty relations is a purely quantum effect referred to as information locking
[DiVincenzo et al. 2004]. A locking scheme can be viewed as a cryptographic protocol in which a uniformly
random n-bit message is encoded in a quantum system using a classical key of size much smaller than
n. Without the key, no measurement of this quantum state can extract more than a negligible amount of
information about the message, in which case the message is said to be “locked”. Furthermore, knowing the
key, it is possible to recover, that is “unlock”, the message.
In this paper, we make the following contributions by exploiting a connection between uncertainty
relations and low-distortion embeddings of Euclidean spaces into slightly larger spaces endowed with the `1
norm. We introduce the notion of a metric uncertainty relation and connect it to low-distortion embeddings of
`2 into `1. A metric uncertainty relation also implies an entropic uncertainty relation. We prove that random
bases satisfy uncertainty relations with a stronger definition and better parameters than previously known.
Our proof is also considerably simpler than earlier proofs. We then apply this result to show the existence of
locking schemes with key size independent of the message length. Moreover, we give efficient constructions
of bases satisfying metric uncertainty relations. The bases defining these metric uncertainty relations are
computable by quantum circuits of almost linear size. This leads to the first explicit construction of a strong
information locking scheme. These constructions are obtained by adapting an explicit norm embedding due
to Indyk [2007] and an extractor construction of Guruswami et al. [2009]. We apply our metric uncertainty
relations to exhibit communication protocols that perform equality testing of n-qubit states. We prove that
this task can be performed by a single message protocol using O(log2 n) qubits and n bits of communication,
where the computation of the sender is efficient.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty relations express the fundamental incompatibility of certain measure-
ments in quantum mechanics [Heisenberg 1927; Robertson 1929]. They quantify the
fact that noncommuting quantum mechanical observables cannot simultaneously have
definite values. Far from just being puzzling constraints on our ability to know the
state of a quantum system, uncertainty relations are at the heart of why some classi-
cally unrealizable cryptographic primitives become realizable when quantum commu-
nication is allowed. For example, so-called entropic uncertainty relations introduced
in [Bialynicki-Birula and Mycielski 1975; Deutsch 1983] are the main ingredients for
modern security proofs for quantum key distribution [Tomamichel and Renner 2011;
Tomamichel et al. 2012] and for secure computation in the bounded and noisy quan-
tum storage models [Damga˚rd et al. 2005; Damga˚rd et al. 2007; Ko¨nig et al. 2012]. A
simple example of an entropic uncertainty relation was given by Maassen and Uffink
[1988]. Let B+ denote a “rectilinear” or computational basis of C2 and B× be a “diag-
onal” or Hadamard basis and let B+n and B×n be the corresponding bases obtained
on the tensor product space (C2)⊗n. All vectors in the rectilinear basis B+n have an
inner product with all vectors in the diagonal basis B×n upper bounded by 2−n/2 in
absolute value. The uncertainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [1988] states that for
any quantum state on n qubits described by a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n, the average
measurement entropy satisfies
1
2
(
H(pB+n ,|ψ〉) +H(pB×n ,|ψ〉)
) ≥ n
2
, (1)
where pB,|ψ〉 denotes the outcome probability distribution when |ψ〉 is measured in
basis B and H denotes the Shannon entropy. Equation (1) expresses the fact that
measuring in a random basis BK , where K ∈u {+n,×n} is uniformly chosen from
the set {+n,×n}, produces an outcome that has some uncertainty irrespective of the
state being measured.
A surprising application of entropic uncertainty relations is the effect known as
information locking [DiVincenzo et al. 2004] (see also [Leung 2009]). Suppose Alice
holds a uniformly distributed random n-bit string X. She chooses a random basis
K ∈u {+n,×n} and encodes X in the basis BK . This random quantum state E(X,K)
is then given to Bob. How much information about X can Bob, who does not know
K, extract from this quantum system via a measurement? To better appreciate the
quantum case, observe that if X were encoded in a classical state Ec(X,K), then
Ec(X,K) would “hide” at most one bit about X; more precisely, the mutual information
between X and Ec(X,K) is at least n − 1. For the quantum encoding E , one can show
that for any measurement that Bob applies on E(X,K) whose outcome is denoted I, the
mutual information between X and I is at most n/2 [DiVincenzo et al. 2004]. The n/2
missing bits of information aboutX are said to be locked in the quantum state E(X,K).
If Bob had access to K, then X can be easily obtained from E(X,K): The one-bit key K
can be used to unlock n/2 bits about X.
A natural question is whether it is possible to lock more than n/2 bits in this way.
In order to achieve this, the key K has to be chosen from a larger set. In terms of
uncertainty relations, this means that we need to consider t > 2 bases to achieve an
average measurement entropy larger than n/2 (equation (1)). In this case, the natural
candidate is a set of tmutually unbiased bases, the defining property of which is a small
inner product between any pair of vectors in different bases. Surprisingly, it was shown
by Ballester and Wehner [2007] and Ambainis [2010] that there are up to t = 2n/2
mutually unbiased bases {B0,B1, . . . ,Bt−1} that only satisfy an average measurement
entropy of n/2, which is only as good as what can be achieved with two measurements
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(1). In other words, looking at the pairwise inner product between vectors in different
bases is not enough to obtain uncertainty relations stronger than (1). It is for this
reason that so little is understood about uncertainty relations for t > 2 measurements.
(See [Wehner and Winter 2010].)
To achieve an average measurement entropy of (1− )n for small  while keeping the
number of bases subexponential in n, the only known constructions are probabilistic
and computationally inefficient. Hayden et al. [2004] prove that random bases satisfy
entropic uncertainty relations of the form (1) with n4 measurements with an average
measurement entropy of n − 3. This leads to an encoding that locks n − 3 bits about
X ∈ {0, 1}n using a key of 4 log n bits. Recently, Dupuis [2010] and Dupuis et al. [2010]
prove that random encodings exhibit a locking behaviour in a stronger sense and that
it is possible to lock up to n−δ bits for any arbitrarily small constant δ while still using
a key of O(log n) bits. To obtain an explicit construction, standard derandomization
techniques are not known to work in this setting. For example, unitary designs
[Dankert et al. 2009] define an exponential number of bases. Moreover, using a δ-
biased subset of the set of Pauli matrices [Ambainis and Smith 2004; Desrosiers and
Dupuis 2010] fails to produce a locking scheme unless the subset has a size of close to
2n (see Appendix D).
1.1. Our results
In this paper, we study uncertainty relations in the light of a connection with low-
distortion embeddings of (Cd, `2) into (Cd
′
, `1). The intuition behind this connection
is very simple. Consider the measurements defined by a set of orthonormal bases
{B0,B1, . . . ,Bt−1} of (C2)⊗n. The bases {B0,B1, . . . ,Bt−1} satisfy an uncertainty relation
if for every n-qubit state |ψ〉 and “most” bases Bk, the vector representing |ψ〉 in Bk is
“spread”. One way of quantifying the spread of a vector is by its `1 norm, i.e., the sum
of the absolute values of its components. A vector |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n of unit `2 norm is well
spread if its `1 norm is close to its maximal value of
√
2n.
Embeddings from a Euclidean space (Rd, `2) into (Rd
′
, `1) (or more generally, any
finite-dimensional normed space) that approximately preserve the norm up to a scaling
factor are typically studied in the area of asymptotic geometric analysis [Dvoretzky
1961; Milman 1971; Figiel et al. 1977; Milman and Schechtman 1986]. More recently,
low-distortion embeddings — and in particular from `2 into `1 — started to gain
interest in the computer science community for their applications to approximation
algorithms and compressed sensing [Indyk 2006; Indyk 2007; Guruswami et al. 2008].
For our applications in quantum information theory, the relevant norm is not the `1
norm but rather a closely related norm called `1(`2).
Motivated by these considerations, we measure the uncertainty of a distribution by
taking a marginal and measuring its closeness to the uniform distribution. This is a
stronger requirement than having large Shannon entropy and it leads to the definition
of a metric uncertainty relation (Definition 2.1). Using standard techniques from
asymptotic geometric analysis, we prove the existence of strong metric uncertainty
relations (Theorem 2.5). This result can be seen as a strengthening of Dvoretzky’s
theorem [Dvoretzky 1961; Milman 1971] for the special case of the `1(`2) norm. In
addition to giving a stronger statement with better parameters, our analysis of the
uncertainty relations satisfied by random bases is simpler than earlier proofs [Hayden
et al. 2004; Dupuis et al. 2010]. In particular, for large n, we prove the existence of
entropic uncertainty relations with average measurement entropy strictly increasing
with the number of measurements. This result leads to better results on the existence
of locking schemes (Corollary 3.4). We also show in Theorem 3.7 how to use these
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locking schemes to build quantum hiding fingerprints as defined by Gavinsky and Ito
[2010].
Moreover, adapting an explicit low-distortion embedding of (Rd, `2) to (Rd
′
, `1) with
d′ = d1+o(1) due to Indyk [2007], we obtain explicit bases of (C2)⊗n that satisfy
strong metric uncertainty relations for a number of bases that is polynomial in n.
Measuring in these bases can be performed by almost linear size quantum circuits.
The use of a strong permutation extractor is the main new ingredient that makes our
“quantization” of Indyk’s construction satisfy stronger uncertainty relations than do
general mutually unbiased bases. A strong permutation extractor (Definition 2.13) is
a small family of permutations of bit strings with the property that for any probability
distribution on input bit strings with high min-entropy, applying a typical permutation
from the family to the input induces an almost uniform probability distribution on a
prefix of the output bits. It is a special kind of randomness extractor, a combinatorial
object with many applications to the theory of pseudorandomness and to cryptography;
see [Shaltiel 2002; Vadhan 2007]. Our construction of efficiently computable bases
satisfying strong metric uncertainty relations involves an alternating application
of approximately mutually unbiased bases and strong permutation extractors. Our
approximately mutually unbiased bases consist of sets of single-qubit Hadamard gates.
Moreover, we build efficiently computable and invertible permutations that define an
extractor using the results of Guruswami et al. [2009].
Even though the idea of combining mutually unbiased bases and extractors comes
from [Indyk 2007], in hindsight, it is very natural from the point of view of quantum
cryptography. Measurements in (approximately) unbiased bases are used in almost all
quantum cryptographic protocols. The objective of such a step is usually to bound the
probability that an adversary can guess the outcome of the associated measurement.
Once such a bound is guaranteed, one can distill the randomness produced into
almost uniform random bits using a step of privacy amplification which makes use
of a randomness extractor. Our quantization of Indyk’s construction can be seen as a
repeated “coherent” application of these two steps.
We use these uncertainty relations to build explicit locking schemes whose encoding
and decoding operations can be performed by quantum circuits of size almost linear
in the length of the message (see Table I). Moreover, we also obtain a locking scheme
where both the encoding and decoding operations consist of a classical computation
with polynomial runtime and a quantum computation using only a small number of
single-qubit Hadamard gates (Corollary 3.5). Performing these quantum operations
can in principle be done using the same technology as implementing the BB84
quantum key distribution protocol [Bennett and Brassard 1984], but our idealized
scheme must still be made robust to noise and imperfect devices. It should be noted
that for this simple scheme, the message is encoded in a slightly larger quantum
system. This locking scheme can be used to obtain string commitment protocols
[Buhrman et al. 2008] that are efficient in terms of computation and communication.
We also give an application of our uncertainty relations to a problem called quantum
identification. Quantum identification is a communication task for two parties Alice
and Bob, where Alice is given a pure quantum state |ψ〉 and Bob wants to simulate
measurements of the form {|ϕ〉〈ϕ|, 1 − |ϕ〉〈ϕ|} on |ψ〉 where |ϕ〉 is a pure quantum
state. This task can be seen as a quantum analogue of the problem of equality testing
[Ahlswede and Dueck 1989; Kushilevitz and Nisan 1997] where Alice and Bob hold
n-bit strings x and y and Bob wants to determine whether x = y using a one-way
classical channel from Alice to Bob. Hayden and Winter [2012] showed that classical
communication alone is useless for quantum identification. However, having access
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Table I. Comparison of different locking schemes. n is the number of bits of the message X. The information
leakage and the size of the key K are measured in bits and the size of the ciphertext E(X,K) in qubits. Efficient
locking schemes have encoding and decoding quantum circuits of size polynomial in n. The locking schemes of
the first and next to last actually have encoding circuits that are in principle implementable with current technology;
they only use classical computations and simple single-qubit transformations. It should be noted that our locking
definition implies all the previous definitions. Note that the variable  can depend on n. For example, one can take
 = η/n to make the information leakage arbitrarily small. The symbol O(·) refers to constants independent of 
and n, but there is a dependence on δ for the next to last row.
Inf. leakage Size of key Size of ciphertext Efficient ?
[DiVincenzo et al. 2004] n/2 1 n yes
[Hayden et al. 2004] 3 4 log(n) n no
[Dupuis et al. 2010] n 2 log(n/2) +O(1) n no
Corollary 3.4 n 2 log(1/) +O(log log(1/)) n+ 2 dlog(9/)e no
Corollary 3.4 n 4 log(1/) +O(log log(1/)) n no
Corollary 3.5 n Oδ(log(n/)) (4 + δ) · n yes
Corollary 3.5 n O(log(n/) log(n)) n yes
to a negligible amount of quantum communication makes classical communication
useful. Their proof is non-explicit. Here, we describe an efficient encoding circuit that
also uses less quantum communication: it allows the identification of an n-qubit state
by communicating only a single message of O(log2 n) qubits and n classical bits.
1.2. Related work
Aubrun, Szarek and Werner [2010; 2011] used a connection between low-distortion
embeddings and quantum information. They show in [Aubrun et al. 2010] that the
existence of large subspaces of highly entangled states follows from Dvoretzky’s
theorem for the Schatten p-norm1 for p > 2. This in turns shows the existence of
channels that violate additivity of minimum output p-Re´nyi entropy as was previously
demonstrated by Hayden and Winter [2008]. Using a more delicate argument [Aubrun
et al. 2011], they are also able to give an alternative proof of a violation of the additivity
conjecture, which was previously found by Hastings [2009].
In a cryptographic setting, Damga˚rd et al. [2004] used ideas related to locking to
develop quantum ciphers that have the property that the key used for encryption can
be recycled. In [Damga˚rd et al. 2005], they construct a quantum key recycling scheme
(see also [Oppenheim and Horodecki 2005]) with near optimal parameters by encoding
the message together with its authentication tag using a full set of mutually unbiased
bases.
1.3. Notation and basic facts
We use the following notation throughout the paper. For a positive integer n, we define
[n] = {0, . . . , n− 1}.
1.3.1. Probability. Random variables are usually denoted by capital letters X,K, . . . ,
while pX denotes the distribution of X, i.e., P {X = x} = pX(x). The notation X ∼ p
means that X has distribution p. unif(S) is the uniform distribution on the set S.
To measure the distance between probability distributions on a finite set X , we use
the total variation distance or trace distance ∆(p, q) = 12
∑
x∈X |p(x) − q(x)|. We will
also write ∆(X,Y ) for ∆(pX , pY ). When ∆(X,Y ) ≤ , we say that X is -close to Y .
A useful characterization of the trace distance is ∆(p, q) = minX∼p,Y∼q P {X 6= Y }
(this equality is known as Doeblin’s coupling lemma [Doeblin 1938]). Another useful
1The Schatten p-norm of a matrix M is defined as the `p norm of a vector of singular values of M .
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measure of closeness between distributions is the fidelity F (p, q) =
∑
x∈X
√
p(x)q(x),
also known as the Bhattacharyya distance and related to the Hellinger distance. We
have the following relation between the fidelity and the trace distance
1− F (p, q) ≤ ∆(p, q) ≤
√
1− F (p, q)2. (2)
The Shannon entropy of a distribution p on X is defined as H(p) = −∑x∈X p(x) log p(x)
where the log is taken here and throughout the paper to be base two. We will also write
H(X) for H(pX). The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is
defined as I(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y ) −H(X,Y ). The min-entropy of a distribution p is
defined as Hmin(p) = − log maxx p(x). We say that a random variable X is a k-source
if Hmin(X) ≥ k. To refer to the i-th component of a vector v ∈ Rn, we usually write vi
except when v already has a subscript, in which case we use v(i). The Hamming weight
of a binary vector v (number of ones) is denoted by w(v) and the Hamming distance
between two binary vectors v, v′ (number of components that are different) is written
as dH(v, v′).
1.3.2. Quantum mechanics. The state of a pure quantum system is represented by a
unit vector in a Hilbert space. Quantum systems are denoted A,B,C . . . and are
identified with their corresponding Hilbert spaces. The dimension of a Hilbert space
A is denoted by dA. Every Hilbert space A comes with a preferred orthonormal basis
{|a〉}a∈[dA] that we call the computational basis. The elements of this basis are labeled
by integers from 0 to dA−1. For a Hilbert space of the form (C2)⊗n, this canonical basis
will also be labeled by strings in {0, 1}n. A ' B means that the Hilbert spaces A and B
are isomorphic.
To describe a distribution {p1, . . . , pr} over quantum states {|ψ1〉, . . . , |ψr〉} (also
called a mixed state), we use a density operator ρ =
∑r
i=1 pi|ψi〉〈ψi|, where |ψ〉〈ψ| refers
to the projector on the line defined by |ψ〉. A density operator is a Hermitian positive
semidefinite operator with unit trace. The density operator associated with a pure
state is abbreviated by omitting the ket and bra ψ := |ψ〉〈ψ|. S(A) is the set of density
operators acting on A. The Hilbert space on which a density operator ρ ∈ S(A) acts is
sometimes denoted by a superscript, as in ρA. This notation is also used for pure states
|ψ〉A ∈ A.
In order to describe the joint state of a system AB, we use the tensor product Hilbert
space A ⊗ B, which is sometimes simply denoted AB. If ρAB describes the joint state
on AB, the state on the system A is described by the partial trace ρA := trB ρAB . If U
is a unitary acting on A, and |ψ〉 a state in A⊗B, we sometimes use U |ψ〉 to denote the
state (U ⊗ 1 B)|ψ〉, where the symbol 1 B is reserved for the identity map on B.
The most general way to obtain classical information from a quantum state is
by performing a measurement. A measurement is described by a positive operator-
valued measure (POVM), which is a set {P1, . . . , Ps} of positive semidefinite operators
that sum to the identity. If the state of the quantum system is represented by the
density operator ρ, the probability of observing the outcome labeled i is tr[Piρ] for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. For a state |ψ〉 ∈ A, p|ψ〉 denotes the distribution of the outcomes of the
measurement of |ψ〉 in the basis {|a〉}. We have p|ψ〉(a) = |〈a|ψ〉|2. Similarly, for a mixed
state ρ, we define pρ(a) = tr[|a〉〈a|ρ].
The trace distance between density operators acting on A is defined by ∆(ρ, σ) =
1
2 tr
√
(ρ− σ)2. The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρA is defined by H(ρA) =
− tr ρ log ρ. It will also be denoted H(A)ρ. For a bipartite state ρAB ∈ S(AB), the
quantum mutual information is I(A;B)ρ = H(A)ρ+H(B)ρ−H(A,B)ρ. We use Fannes’
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inequality [Fannes 1973], or more precisely an improvement by Audenaert [2007],
which states that for any states ρ and σ on A,
|H(ρ)−H(σ)| ≤ ∆(ρ, σ) log dA + h2(∆(ρ, σ)), (3)
with h2() = − log()− (1− ) log(1− ).
2. UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS
Outline of the section. In this section, we start by introducing uncertainty relations
and setting up some notation (Section 2.1). Then, we define metric uncertainty
relations in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we prove the existence of strong metric
uncertainty relations. Explicit constructions are given in Section 2.4.
2.1. Background
Consider a set of orthonormal bases B = {B0, . . . ,Bt−1} of the Hilbert space C.
Each basis Bk = (vk0 , . . . , vkdC−1) defines a measurement on C. The outcomes of these
measurements are indexed by x ∈ [dC ]. The outcome distribution pBk,|ψ〉 when the
measurement is performed on the state |ψ〉 ∈ C is defined by pBk,|ψ〉(x) = |〈vkx|ψ〉|2 for
all x ∈ [dC ]. An uncertainty relation for a set of orthonormal bases B = {B0, . . . ,Bt−1}
expresses the property that for any state |ψ〉 ∈ C, there are some measurements in B
whose outcomes given state |ψ〉 have some uncertainty. A common way of quantifying
this uncertainty is by using the Shannon entropy. The set of bases B is said to satisfy
an entropic uncertainty relation if there exists a positive number h such that for all
states |ψ〉 ∈ C,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pBk,|ψ〉) ≥ h.
Note that by choosing a state |ψ〉 in the basis B0, we obtain H(pB0,|ψ〉) = 0. As
H(pB,|ψ〉) ≤ log dC , this implies that h cannot be larger than (1− 1/t) log dC .
It is more convenient here to talk about uncertainty relations for a set of unitary
transformations. Let {|x〉C}x be the computational basis of C. We associate to the
unitary transformation U the basis {U†|x〉}x. On a state |ψ〉, the outcome distribution
is described by
pU |ψ〉(x) = |〈x|U |ψ〉|2.
As can be seen from this equation, we can equivalently talk about measuring the state
U |ψ〉 in the computational basis. An entropic uncertainty relation for U0, . . . , Ut−1 can
be written as
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ h. (4)
Entropic uncertainty relations have been used to prove the security of quantum key
distribution and of cryptographic protocols in the bounded and noisy quantum storage
models [Tomamichel and Renner 2011; Damga˚rd et al. 2007; Berta et al. 2012]. Other
applications of entropic uncertainty relations are given in Section 3. For more details
on entropic uncertainty relations and their applications, see the recent survey [Wehner
and Winter 2010].
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2.2. Metric uncertainty relations
Here, instead of using the entropy as a measure of uncertainty, we use closeness
to the uniform distribution. In other words, we are interested in sets of unitary
transformations U0, . . . , Ut−1 that for all |ψ〉 ∈ C satisfy
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pUk|ψ〉,unif([dC ])
) ≤ 
for some  ∈ (0, 1). ∆(p, q) refers to the total variation distance between the
distributions p and q. This condition is very strong, in fact too strong for our purposes,
and we will see that a weaker definition is sufficient to imply entropic uncertainty
relations. Let C = A ⊗ B. (For example, if C consists of n qubits, A might represent
the first n − log n qubits and B the last log n qubits.) Moreover, let the computational
basis for C be of the form {|a〉A ⊗ |b〉B}a,b where {|a〉} and {|b〉} are the computational
bases of A and B. Instead of asking for the outcome of the measurement on the
computational basis of the whole space to be uniform, we only require that the outcome
of a measurement of the A system in its computational basis {|a〉} be close to uniform.
More precisely, we define for a ∈ [dA],
pAUk|ψ〉(a) =
dB−1∑
b=0
|〈a|A〈b|BUk|ψ〉|2.
We can then define a metric uncertainty relation. Naturally, the larger the A system,
the stronger the uncertainty relation for a fixed B system.
Definition 2.1 (Metric uncertainty relation). Let A and B be Hilbert spaces. We
say that a set {U0, . . . , Ut−1} of unitary transformations on AB satisfies an -metric
uncertainty relation on A if for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ . (5)
Remark. Observe that this implies that (5) also holds for mixed states: for any
ψ ∈ S(A⊗B), 1t
∑t−1
k=0 ∆
(
pA
UkψU
†
k
,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Metric uncertainty relations imply entropic uncertainty relations. In the next
proposition, we show that a metric uncertainty relation gives rise to an entropic
uncertainty relation. It is worth stressing that there are no restrictions on
measurements.
PROPOSITION 2.2. Let  ∈ (0, 1) and {U0, . . . , Ut−1} be a set of unitaries on AB
satisfying an -metric uncertainty relation on A:
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Then
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− ) log dA − h2().
where h2 is the binary entropy function.
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PROOF. Recall that the distribution pAUk|ψ〉 (see equation (5) for a definition) on [dA]
is a marginal of the distribution pUk|ψ〉. Thus H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ H(pAUk,|ψ〉). Using Fannes-
Audenaert’s inequality (3), we have for all k
H(pAUk|ψ〉) ≥ log dA −∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
log dA − h2
(
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
))
.
By averaging over k and using the concavity of h2, we get the desired result.
Explicit link to low-distortion embeddings. Even though we do not explicitly use the
link to low-distortion embeddings, we describe the connection as it might have other
applications. In the definition of metric uncertainty relations, the distance between
distributions was computed using the trace distance. The connection to low-distortion
metric embeddings is clearer when we measure closeness of distributions using the
fidelity. We have
F
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
=
1√
dA
dA−1∑
a=0
√
pAUk|ψ〉(a)
=
1√
dA
dA−1∑
a=0
√√√√dB−1∑
b=0
|〈a|A〈b|BUk|ψ〉|2
=
1√
dA
‖Uk|ψ〉‖`A1 (`B2 ) (6)
where the norm `A1 (`B2 ) is defined by
Definition 2.3 (`1(`2) norm). For a state |ψ〉 =
∑
a∈[dA],b∈[dB ] αa,b|a〉A|b〉B ,∥∥|ψ〉∥∥
`A1 (`
B
2 )
=
∑
a∈[dA]
∥∥{αa,b}b∥∥2 = ∑
a∈[dA]
√ ∑
b∈[dB ]
|αa,b|2.
We use ‖ · ‖12 := ‖ · ‖`A1 (`B2 ) when the systems A and B are clear from the context.
Observe that this definition of norm depends on the choice of the computational basis.
The `A1 (`B2 ) norm will always be taken with respect to the computational bases.
For {U0, . . . , Ut−1} to satisfy an uncertainty relation, we want
1
t
∑
k
1√
dA
‖Uk|ψ〉‖`A1 (`B2 ) ≥ 1− .
This expression can be rewritten by introducing a new register K that holds the index
k. We get for all |ψ〉 by writing C = AB∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )
≥ (1− )
√
t · dA. (7)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, which in this context reads ‖|φ〉‖`A1 (`B2 ) ≤√
dA‖|φ〉‖2 for any |φ〉 ∈ AB, we have that for all |ψ〉,∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )
≤
√
t · dA
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√t∑
k
Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
√
t · dA. (8)
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Rewriting (7) and (8) as
(1− ) ≤ 1√
t · dA
·
∥∥∥ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥
`AK1 (`
B
2 )∥∥∥ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉C |k〉K
∥∥∥
2
≤ 1,
we see that the image of C by the linear map |ψ〉 7→ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉 is an almost
Euclidean subspace of (A ⊗ K ⊗ B, `AK1 (`B2 )). In other words, as the map |ψ〉 7→
1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉 is an isometry (in the `2 sense), it is an embedding of (C, `2) into
(AKB, `AK1 (`
B
2 )) with distortion 1/(1− ) [Matousˇek 2002].
Observe that a general low-distortion embedding of (C, `2) into (AKB, `AK1 (`B2 ))
does not necessarily give a metric uncertainty relation as it need not be of the form
|ψ〉 7→ 1√
t
∑
k Uk|ψ〉 ⊗ |k〉. When t = 2, a metric uncertainty relation is related to the
notion of Kashin decomposition [Kashin 1977]; see also [Pisier 1989; Szarek 2006].
A remark on the composition of metric uncertainty relations. There is a natural way
of building an uncertainty relation for a Hilbert space from uncertainty relations
on smaller Hilbert spaces. This composition property is also important for the
cryptographic applications of metric uncertainty relations presented in the second half
of the paper, in which setting it ensures the security of parallel composition of locking-
based encryption.
PROPOSITION 2.4. Consider Hilbert spaces A1, A2, B1, B2. For i ∈ {0, 1}, let
{U (i)ki }ki∈[ti] be a set of unitary transformations of Ai ⊗ Bi satisfying an -metric
uncertainty relation on Ai. Then, {U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
}k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2] satisfies a 2-metric
uncertainty relation on A1 ⊗A2.
PROOF. Let |ψ〉 ∈ (A1⊗B1)⊗(A2⊗B2) and let pk1,k2 denote the distribution obtained
by measuring U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
|ψ〉 in the computational basis of A1 ⊗ A2. Our objective is to
show that
1
t1t2
∑
k1∈[t1],k2∈[t2]
∆(pk1,k2 ,unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ])) ≤ 2. (9)
We have
∆(pk1,k2 ,unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ]))
=
1
2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)− 1dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)− p
A1
k1,k2
(a1)
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 12 ∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣p
A1
k1,k2
(a1)
dA2
− 1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
a1
pA1k1,k2(a1)
∑
a2
∣∣∣∣∣pk1,k2(a1, a2)pA1k1,k2(a1) −
1
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 12 ∑
a1
∣∣∣∣pA1k1,k2(a1)− 1dA1
∣∣∣∣ (10)
where pA1k1,k2(a1) :=
∑
a2
pk1,k2(a1, a2) is the outcome distribution of measuring the A1
system of U (1)k1 ⊗ U
(2)
k2
|ψ〉. The distribution pA1k1,k2 can also be seen as the outcome of
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measuring the mixed state
U
(1)
k1
ψA1B1U
(1)
k1
†
in the computational basis {|a1〉}. Thus, we have for any k2 ∈ [t2],
1
t1
∑
k1
∆
(
pA1k1,k2 ,unif([dA1 ])
)
≤ .
Moreover, for a1 ∈ [dA1 ], the distribution on [dA2 ] defined by pk1,k2 (a1,a2)pA1k1,k2 (a1)
is the outcome
distribution of measuring in the computational basis of A2 the state
U
(2)
k2
ψA2B2k1,a1 U
(2)
k2
†
where ψA2B2k1,a1 is the density operator describing the state of the system A2B2 given that
the outcome of the measurement of the A1 system is a1. We can now use the fact that
{U (2)k2 } satisfies a metric uncertainty relation. Taking the average over k1 and k2 in
equation (10), we get
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∆(pk1,k2 ,unif([dA1 ]× [dA2 ])) ≤ 2.
This observation is in the same spirit as [Indyk and Szarek 2010, Proposition 1], and
can in fact be used to build large almost Euclidean subspaces of `A1 (`B2 ).
2.3. Metric uncertainty relations: existence
In this section, we prove the existence of families of unitary transformations satisfying
strong uncertainty relations. The proof proceeds by showing that choosing random
unitaries according to the Haar measure defines a metric uncertainty relation with
positive probability. The techniques used are quite standard and date back to Milman’s
proof of Dvoretzky’s theorem [Milman 1971; Figiel et al. 1977]. In fact, using the
connection to embeddings of `2 into `1(`2) presented in the previous section, this
existential theorem can be viewed as a strengthening of Dvoretzky’s theorem for the
`1(`2) norm [Milman and Schechtman 1986]. Explicit constructions of uncertainty
relations are presented in the next section.
In order to use metric uncertainty relations to build quantum hiding fingerprints,
we require an additional property for {U0, . . . , Ut−1}. A set of unitary transformations
{U0, . . . , Ut−1} of Cd is said to define γ-approximately mutually unbiased bases (γ-
MUBs) if for all elements |x〉 and |y〉 of the computational basis and all k 6= k′, we
have
|〈x|U†kUk′ |y〉| ≤
1
dγ/2
. (11)
1-MUBs correspond to the usual notion of mutually unbiased bases.
THEOREM 2.5 (EXISTENCE OF METRIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS). Let c = 16
and  ∈ (0, 1). Let A and B be Hilbert spaces with dimB ≥ 9/2 and d := dimA ⊗ B.
Then, for all t > 72c·ln(9/)2 , there exists a set {U0, . . . , Ut−1} of unitary transformations
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of AB satisfying an -metric uncertainty relation on A: for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Moreover, for γ ∈ (0, 1) and d such that 4t2d2 exp (−d1−γ) < 1/2, the unitaries
{U0, . . . , Ut−1} can be chosen to also form γ-MUBs.
Remark. The proof proceeds by choosing a set of unitary transformations at
random. See (14) and (15) for a precise bound on the probability that such a set does
not form a metric uncertainty relation or a γ-MUB.
PROOF. The basic idea is to evaluate the expected value of ∆
(
pAU |ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
for
a fixed state |ψ〉 when U is a random unitary chosen according to the Haar measure.
Then, we use a concentration argument to show that with high probability, this
distance is close to its expected value. After this step, we show that the additional
averaging 1t
∑t−1
k=0 ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
of t independent copies results in additional
concentration at a rate that depends on t. We conclude by showing the existence of a
family of unitaries that makes this expression small for all states |ψ〉 using a union
bound over a δ-net. The main ingredients of the proof are stated here but only proved
in Appendix A.
We start by computing the expected value of the fidelity E
{
F
(
pAU |ψ〉,unif([dA])
)}
,
which can be seen as an `1(`2) norm.
LEMMA 2.6 (EXPECTED VALUE OF `A1 (`B2 ) OVER THE SPHERE). Let |ϕ〉AB be a
random pure state on AB. Then,
E
{
F
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)}
≥
√
1− 1
dB
.
We then use the inequality ∆(p, q) ≤
√
1− F (p, q)2 to get
E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)}
≤ E
{√
1− F
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)2}
.
By the concavity of the function x 7→ √1− x2 on the interval [0, 1],
E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)}
≤
√
1−E
{
F
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)}2
≤
√
1−
(
1− 1
dB
)
≤ /3.
The last inequality comes from the hypothesis of the theorem that dB ≥ 9/2. In other
words, for any fixed |ψ〉, the average over U of the trace distance between pAU |ψ〉 and
the uniform distribution is at most /3. Setting µ = E
{
∆
(
pA|ϕ〉,unif([dA])
)}
, the next
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step is to evaluate P
{∣∣∣ 1t ∑t−1k=0 ∆(pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA]))− µ∣∣∣ ≥ /3}. This is done using a
concentration inequality on the product of spheres. For completeness, an approach
that is more elementary is presented in the appendix (Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2).
While this second approach is more elementary, it leads to slightly worse constants
and additional technical constraints on the relation between t and d. However, these
constraints do not substantially affect our conclusion.
LEMMA 2.7 (CONCENTRATION INEQUALITY ON THE PRODUCT OF SPHERES). Let
f : (Cd)×t → R and η > 0 be such that for all pure states |ϕ0〉, . . . |ϕt−1〉 and
|ψ0〉, . . . , |ψt−1〉 in Cd,
∣∣f(|ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉)− f(|ψ0〉, . . . , |ψt−1〉)∣∣ ≤ η
√√√√t−1∑
i=0
‖|ϕi〉 − |ψi〉‖22.
Let |ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉 be independent random pure states in dimension d. Then for all
δ ≥ 0,
P
{∣∣∣f(|ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉)−E {f(|ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉)} ∣∣∣ ≥ δ} ≤ 4 exp(−δ2d
cη2
)
where c is a constant. We can take c = 16.
PROOF. We start by applying Example 6.5.2 of [Milman and Schechtman 1986]
to obtain concentration around the median. Then to prove concentration around the
mean, we can use the general Proposition V.4 also from [Milman and Schechtman
1986].
We apply this concentration result to f : |ϕ0〉AB , . . . , |ϕt−1〉AB 7→
1
t
∑t−1
k=0 ∆
(
pA|ϕk〉,unif([dA])
)
. We start by finding an upper bound on the Lipshitz
constant η. For any pure states {|ϕk〉AB}k and {|ψk〉AB}k, we have
|f(|ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉)− f(|ψ0〉, . . . , |ψt−1〉)|
≤ 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAϕk , p
A
ψk
)
≤ 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
1
2
∑
a,b
∣∣|〈a|〈b||ϕk〉|2 − |〈a|〈b||ψk〉|2∣∣
≤ 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
1
2
√∑
a,b
∣∣|〈a|〈b||ϕk〉|+ |〈a|〈b||ψk〉|∣∣2 ·∑
a,b
||〈a|〈b||ϕk〉| − |〈a|〈b||ψk〉||2.
The first two inequalities follow from the triangle inequality. The third inequality is
due to the Cauchy Schwarz inequality. Continuing,
|f(|ϕ0〉, . . . , |ϕt−1〉)− f(|ψ0〉, . . . , |ψt−1〉)| ≤ 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
‖|ϕk〉 − |ψk〉‖2
≤ 1√
t
√√√√t−1∑
k=0
‖|ϕk〉 − |ψk〉‖22. (12)
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The first inequality follows again from the triangle inequality and the last inequality
follows from the Cauchy Schwarz inequality. Applying Lemma 2.7 with η = 1/
√
t, we
obtain
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
− µ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ /3
}
≤ 4 exp
(
− (/3)
2td
c
)
.
This inequality can also be achieved with a slightly worse constant by first applying
Le´vy’s Lemma A.1 to the function ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
and then using Lemma A.2 to
prove that averaging of t independent copies results in additional concentration at a
rate of t .
Continuing with Lemma 2.6, we have
P
{
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≥ 2/3
}
≤ 4 exp
(
−
2td
9c
)
. (13)
We would like to have the event described in (13) hold for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB. For
this, we construct a finite set N of states (a δ-net) for which we can ensure that
1
t
∑t−1
k=0 ∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
< 2/3 for all |ψ〉 ∈ N holds with high probability. See
e.g., [Hayden et al. 2004, Lemma II.4] for a proof.
LEMMA 2.8 (δ-NET). Let δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists a set N of pure states in Cd with
|N | ≤ (3/δ)2d such that for every pure state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd (i.e., ‖|ψ〉‖2 = 1), there exists
|ψ˜〉 ∈ N such that
‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 ≤ δ.
Let N be the /3-net obtained by applying this lemma to the space AB with δ = /3.
We have
P
{
∃|ψ〉 ∈ N : 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≥ 2/3
}
≤ |N | · 4 exp
(
−
2td
9c
)
≤ 4 exp
(
−d
(
2t
9c
− 2 ln(9/)
))
.
Now for an arbitrary state |ψ〉 ∈ AB, we know that there exists |ψ˜〉 ∈ N such that
‖|ψ〉 − |ψ˜〉‖2 ≤ /3. As a consequence, for any unitary transformation U ,
∆
(
pAU |ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉,unif([dA])
)
+ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉, p
A
U |ψ〉
)
≤ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉,unif([dA])
)
+ ‖U |ψ˜〉 − U |ψ〉‖2
≤ ∆
(
pA
U |ψ˜〉,unif([dA])
)
+ /3.
In the first inequality, we used the triangle inequality and the second inequality can
be derived as in (12). Thus,
P
{
∃|ψ〉 ∈ AB : 1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
) ≥ } ≤ 4 exp(−d(2t
9c
− 2 ln(9/)
))
. (14)
If t > 4·18c·ln(9/)2 , this bound is strictly smaller than 1/2 and the result follows.
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To prove that we can suppose that {U0, . . . , Ut−1} define γ-MUBs, consider the
function f : |ϕ〉 7→ 〈ψ|ϕ〉 for some fixed vector |ψ〉. Then, if |ϕ〉 is a random pure state,
we have E {f(|ϕ〉)} = 0. Moreover, f is 1-Lipschitz. Thus, Lemma 2.7 for t = 1, or more
simply Le´vy’s Lemma A.1, with δ = d−γ/2 gives
P
{
|〈ψ|ϕ〉| ≥ d−γ/2
}
≤ 4 exp
(
−d
1−γ
c
)
.
As a result,
P
{
∃k 6= k′, x, y ∈ [d], |〈x|U†kUk′ |y〉| ≥ d−γ
}
≤ 4t2d2 exp
(
−d
1−γ
c
)
(15)
which completes the proof.
COROLLARY 2.9 (EXISTENCE OF ENTROPIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS). Let C be
a Hilbert space of dimension d > 2. There exists a universal constant c′ ≥ 1 such that
for any integer t > 2, there exists a set {U0, . . . , Ut−1} of unitary transformations of C
satisfying the following entropic uncertainty relation: for any state |ψ〉,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥
(
1−
√
c′ log t
t
)
log d− log
(
18t
c′ log t
)
− h2
(√
c′ log t
t
)
where h2() is the binary entropy function. In particular, in the limit d→∞, we obtain
the existence of a sequence of sets of t bases satisfying
lim
d→∞
1
t
∑t−1
k=0H(pUk|ψ〉)
log d
≥ 1−
√
c′ log t
t
.
Remark. Recall that the bases (or measurements) that constitute the uncertainty
relation are defined as the images of the computational basis by U†k . Note that as
argued previously, we can always choose a state |ψ〉 that is a basis vector for one of
the bases U0, . . . , Ut−1. Thus, for any set of unitaries {U0, . . . , Ut−1}, there exists |ψ〉
such that
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≤
(
1− 1
t
)
log d.
It is an open question whether there exists uncertainty relations matching this bound,
even asymptotically as d → ∞ [Wehner and Winter 2010]. Wehner and Winter [2010]
ask whether there even exists a function f growing to +∞ such that
lim
d→∞
1
t
∑t−1
k=0H(pUk|ψ〉)
log d
≥ 1− 1
f(t)
.
The corollary answers this question in the affirmative with f(t) =
√
t
c′ log t .
PROOF. Define c′ = 100cwhere c comes from Lemma 2.7,  =
√
c′ log t
t and decompose
C = A⊗ B with dB =
⌈
9/2
⌉
. Applying Theorem 2.5 and observing that our choice of 
is such that t > 72c log(9/)/2, we get a family U0, . . . , Ut−1 of unitary transformations
that satisfies
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
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By Proposition 2.2, these unitary transformations also satisfy an entropic uncertainty
relation:
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pAUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− ) log
(
d
d9/2e
)
− h2()
≥ (1− ) log d− log(18/2)− h2().
2.4. Metric uncertainty relations: explicit construction
In this section, we are interested in obtaining families {U0, . . . , Ut−1} of unitaries
satisfying metric uncertainty relations where U0, . . . , Ut−1 are explicit and efficiently
computable using a quantum computer. For this section, we consider for simplicity a
Hilbert space composed of qubits, i.e., of dimension d = 2n for some integer n. This
Hilbert space is of the form A⊗B where A describes the states of the first log dA qubits
and B the last log dB qubits. Note that we assume that both dA and dB are powers of
two.
We construct a set of unitaries by adapting an explicit low-distortion embedding
of (Rd, `2) into (Rd
′
, `1) with d′ = d1+o(1) found by Indyk [2007]. The construction
has two main ingredients: a set of mutually unbiased bases and an extractor. More
specifically the embedding consists of repeated applications of the following procedure.
The input vector is encoded into a small number of mutually unbiased bases from
[Heath et al. 2006] and all these encodings are concatenated. The components of this
longer vector are then shuffled in a way specified by an extractor construction due to
[Zuckerman 1997] so that the coefficients on some fixed known coordinates are flat. In
the following step, the same procedure is applied on the remaining coordinates that do
not necessarily have flat coefficients. Our construction uses the same paradigm while
requiring additional properties of both the mutually unbiased bases and the extractor.
In order to obtain a locking scheme that only needs simple quantum operations,
we construct sets of approximately mutually unbiased bases from a restricted set
of unitaries that can be implemented with single-qubit Hadamard gates. Moreover,
we impose three additional properties on the extractor: we need our extractor to be
strong, to define a permutation and to be efficiently invertible. An extractor is said to
be strong if the output is close to uniform even given the seed. We want the extractor
to be strong because we are constructing metric uncertainty relations as opposed to a
norm embedding. The property of being a permutation extractor is needed to ensure
that the induced transformation on (C2)⊗n preserves the `2 norm. We also require the
efficient invertibility condition to be able to build an efficient quantum circuit for the
permutation. See Definition 2.13 for a precise formulation.
The intuition behind Indyk’s construction is as follows. Let V0, . . . , Vr−1 be unitaries
defining (approximately) mutually unbiased bases (defined in equation (11)) and let
{Py}y∈S be a permutation extractor (defined later in Definition 2.13). The role of the
mutually unbiased bases is to guarantee that for all states |ψ〉 and for most values
of j ∈ [r], most of the mass of the state Vj |ψ〉 is “well spread” in the computational
basis. This spread is measured in terms of the min-entropy of the distribution pVj |ψ〉.
Then, the extractor {Py}y will ensure that on average over y ∈ S, the masses∑
b |〈a|〈b|PyVj |ψ〉|2 are almost equal for all a ∈ [dA]. More precisely, the distribution
pAPyVj |ψ〉 is close to uniform.
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As shown in the following lemma, there is a construction of mutually unbiased bases
that can be efficiently implemented [Wootters and Fields 1989]. The proof of the lemma
is deferred to Appendix B.
LEMMA 2.10 (QUANTUM CIRCUITS FOR MUBS). Let n be a positive integer and
d = 2n. For any integer r ≤ d + 1, there exists a family V0, . . . , Vr−1 of unitary
transformations of Cd that define mutually unbiased bases. Moreover, there is a
randomized classical algorithm with runtime O(n2 polylog n) that takes as input j ∈ [r]
and outputs a binary vector αj ∈ {0, 1}2n−1, and a quantum circuit of size O(npolylog n)
that when given as input the vector αj (classical input) and a quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ Cd
outputs Vj |ψ〉.
Remark. The randomization in the algorithm is used to find an irreducible
polynomial of degree n over F2[X]. It could be replaced by a deterministic algorithm
that runs in timeO(n4 polylog n). Observe that if n is odd and r ≤ (d+1)/2, it is possible
to choose the unitary transformations to be real (see [Heath et al. 2006]).
It is also possible to obtain approximately mutually unbiased bases that use smaller
circuits. In fact, the following lemma shows that we can construct large sets of
approximately mutually unbiased bases defined by unitaries in the restricted set
H = {Hv := Hv1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hvn , v ∈ {0, 1}n},
where H is the Hadamard transform on C2 defined by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
In our construction of metric uncertainty relations (Theorem 2.15), we could use the
1-MUBs of Lemma 2.10 or the (1/2 − δ)-MUBs of Lemma 2.11. As the construction of
approximate MUBs is simpler and can be implemented with simpler circuits, we will
mostly be using Lemma 2.11.
LEMMA 2.11 (APPROXIMATE MUBS IN H). Let n′ be a positive integer and n = 2n′ .
(1) For any integer r ≤ n, there exists a family V0, . . . , Vr−1 ∈ H that define 1/2-MUBs.
(2) For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2), there exists a constant c > 0 independent of n such that for any
r ≤ 2cn there exists a family V0, . . . , Vr−1 of unitary transformations inH that define
(1/2− δ)-MUBs.
Moreover, in both cases, given an index j ∈ [r], there is a polynomial time (classical)
algorithm that computes the vector v ∈ {0, 1}n that defines the unitary Vj = Hv.
PROOF. Observe that for any v, v′ and x, y ∈ {0, 1}n
|〈x|HvHv′ |y〉| =
∏
j
〈xj |HvjHv′j |yj〉 ≤ 1
2dH(v,v′)/2
. (16)
Using this observation, we see that a binary code C ⊆ {0, 1}n with minimum distance
γn defines a set of γ-MUBs inH. It is now sufficient to find binary codes with minimum
distance as large as possible. For the first construction, we use the Hadamard code that
has minimum distance n/2. The Hadamard codewords are indexed by x ∈ {0, 1}n′ ; the
codeword corresponding to x is the vector v ∈ {0, 1}n whose coordinates are vz = x·z for
all z ∈ {0, 1}n′ . This code has the largest possible minimum distance for a non-trivial
binary code but its shortcoming is that the number of codewords is only n. For our
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applications, it is sometimes desirable to have r larger than n (this is useful to allow
the error parameter  of our metric uncertainty relation to be smaller than n−1/2).
For the second construction, we use families of linear codes with minimum distance
(1/2 − δ)n with a number of codewords that is exponential in n. For this, we can
use Reed-Solomon codes concatenated with linear codes on {0, 1}Θ(n′) that match the
performance of random linear codes; see for example Appendix E in [Goldreich 2008].
For a simpler construction, note that we can also get 2Ω(
√
n) codewords by using a
Reed-Solomon code concatenated with a Hadamard code.
The next lemma shows that for any state |ψ〉, for most values of j, the distribution
pVj |ψ〉 is close to a distribution with large min-entropy provided {Vj} define γ-MUBs.
This result might be of independent interest. In fact, Damga˚rd et al. [2007] prove a
lower bound close to n/2 on the min-entropy of a measurement in the computational
basis of the state U |ψ〉 where U is chosen uniformly from the full set of the 2n unitaries
ofH. They leave as an open question the existence of small subsets ofH that satisfy the
same uncertainty relation. When used with the γ-MUBs of Lemma 2.11, the following
lemma partially answers this question by exhibiting such sets of size polynomial in n
but with a min-entropy lower bound close to n/4 instead.
LEMMA 2.12. Let n ≥ 1, d = 2n and  ∈ (0, 1) and consider a set of r = ⌈ 22 ⌉ unitary
transformations V0, . . . , Vr−1 of Cd defining γ-MUBs. For all |ψ〉 ∈ Cd,∣∣∣{j ∈ [r] : ∃ distribution qj ,∆(pVj |ψ〉, qj) ≤  and Hmin(qj) ≥ γn2 − 2}∣∣∣ ≥ (1− )r.
PROOF. This proof proceeds along the lines of [Indyk 2007, Lemma 4.2]. Similar
results can also be found in the sparse approximation literature; see [Tropp 2004,
Proposition 4.3] and references therein.
Consider the rd × d matrix V obtained by concatenating the rows of the matrices
V0, . . . , Vr−1. For S ⊆ [rd], VS denotes the submatrix of V obtained by selecting the
rows in S. The coordinates of the vector V |ψ〉 ∈ Crd are indexed by z ∈ [rd] and denoted
by (V |ψ〉)z.
Claim. We have for any set S ⊆ [rd] of size at most dγ/2 and any unit vector |ψ〉,
then
‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 1 +
|S|
dγ/2
. (17)
To prove the claim, we want an upper bound on the operator 2-norm of the matrix (VS),
which is the square root of the largest eigenvalue of G = VSV †S . As two distinct rows of
V have an inner product bounded by 1
dγ/2
, the non-diagonal entries of G are bounded
by 1
dγ/2
. Moreover, the diagonal entries of G are all 1. By the Gershgorin circle theorem,
all the eigenvalues of G lie in the disc centered at 1 of radius |S|−1
dγ/2
. We conclude that
(17) holds.
Now pick S to be the set of indices of the dγ/2 largest entries of the vector
{|(V |ψ〉)z|2}z∈[rd]. Using the previous claim, we have ‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 2. Moreover, since
S contains the dγ/2 largest entries of {|(V |ψ〉)z|2}z, we have that for all z /∈ S,
|(V |ψ〉)z|2dγ/2 ≤ ‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 2. Thus, for all z /∈ S, |(V |ψ〉)z|2 ≤ 2dγ/2 .
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We now build the distributions qj . For every j ∈ [r], define
wj =
∑
z∈S∩{jr,...,(j+1)r−1}
|(V |ψ〉)z|2,
which is the total weight in S of Vj |ψ〉. Defining T = {j : wj > }, we have
|T| ≤ ‖(V |ψ〉)S‖22 ≤ 2. Thus,
|T| ≤ 2/ ≤ r.
We define the distribution qj for j ∈ [r] by
qj(x) =
{ |〈x|Vj |ψ〉|2 + wjd if jd+ x /∈ Swj
d if jd+ x ∈ S.
Since ∑
x
qj(x) = wj +
∑
x∈[d]:jd+x/∈S
|〈x|Vj |ψ〉|2 =
∑
x∈[d]
|〈x|Vj |ψ〉|2 = 1,
qj is a probability distribution. Moreover, we have that for j /∈ T
∆
(
pVj |ψ〉, qj
) ≤ 1
2
 ∑
x:jd+x/∈S
wj
d
+
∑
x:jd+x∈S
(wj
d
+ |〈x|Vj |ψ〉|2
) = wj ≤ .
The distribution qj also has the property that for all x ∈ [d], qj(x) ≤ 2dγ/2 + 1d ≤ 3dγ/2 . In
other words, Hmin(qj) ≥ γn2 − 2.
We now move to the second building block in Indyk’s construction: randomness
extractors. Randomness extractors are functions that extract uniform random bits
from weak sources of randomness.
Definition 2.13 (Strong permutation extractor). Let n and m ≤ n be positive
integers, ` ∈ [0, n] and  ∈ (0, 1). A family of permutations {Py}y∈S of {0, 1}n where
each permutation Py is described by two functions PEy : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (the first m
output bits of Py) and PRy : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m (the last n−m output bits of Py) is said
to be an explicit (n, `)→ m strong permutation extractor if:
— For any random variable X on {0, 1}n such that Hmin(X) ≥ `, and an independent
seed US uniformly distributed over S, we have
∆
(
p(
US ,PEUS
(X)
),unif(S × {0, 1}m)
)
≤ ,
which is equivalent to
1
|S|
∑
y∈S
∆
(
pPEy (X),unif({0, 1}m)
)
≤ . (18)
— For all y ∈ S, both the function Py and its inverse P−1y are computable in time
polynomial in n.
Remark. The usual definition of extractors does not require the functions to be
permutations or to be efficiently invertible. But for this paper, these conditions are
needed. A similar definition of permutation extractors was used in [Reingold et al.
2000] in order to avoid some entropy loss in an extractor construction. Here, the
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reason we use permutation extractors is different; it is because we want the induced
transformation Py on C2
n
to preserve the `2 norm.
We can adapt an extractor construction of [Guruswami et al. 2009] to obtain a
permutation extractor with the following parameters. The details of the construction
are presented in Appendix C.
THEOREM 2.14 (EXPLICIT STRONG PERMUTATION EXTRACTORS). For all (con-
stant) δ ∈ (0, 1), all positive integers n, all ` ∈ [c log(n/), n] (c is a constant independent
of n and ), and all  ∈ (0, 1/2), there is an explicit (n, `)→ (1− δ)` strong permutation
extractor {Py}y∈S with log |S| ≤ O(log(n/)). Moreover, the functions (x, y) 7→ Py(x) and
(x, y) 7→ P−1y (x) can be computed by circuits of size O(n polylog(n/)).
A permutation P on {0, 1}n defines a unitary transformation on (C2)⊗n that we
also call P . The permutation extractor {Py} will be seen as a family of unitary
transformations over n qubits. Moreover, just as we decomposed the space {0, 1}n into
the first m bits and the last n − m bits, we decompose the space (C2)⊗n into A ⊗ B,
where A represents the first m qubits and B represents the last n − m qubits. The
properties of {PEy } will then be reflected in the system A.
Recall that Lemma 2.12 stated that after a measurement in a randomly selected
basis from an approximately mutually unbiased set, the min-entropy of the outcome
is quite large. This means that if we follow this measurement with an extractor,
the output will be almost uniform, which is exactly what we need. Thus, using
the construction of Theorem 2.14, we obtain a set of unitaries satisfying a metric
uncertainty relation.
THEOREM 2.15 (EXPLICIT UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS: KEY OPTIMIZED). Let δ >
0 be a constant, n be a positive integer,  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) (c′ is a constant independent of
n). Then, there exist t ≤ (n )c (for some constant c independent of n and ) unitary
transformations U0, . . . , Ut−1 acting on n qubits such that: if A represents the first
(1− δ)n/4−O(1) qubits and B represents the remaining qubits, then for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs
the state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by a classical computation with polynomial runtime
and a quantum circuit that consists of single-qubit Hadamard gates on a subset of the
qubits followed by a permutation in the computational basis. This permutation can be
computed by (classical or quantum) circuits of size O(npolylog(n/)).
Remark. Observe that in terms of the dimension d of the Hilbert space, the number
of unitaries t is polylogarithmic.
PROOF. Let ′ = /6. Lemma 2.11 gives r =
⌈
2/′2
⌉
unitary transformations
V0, . . . , Vr−1 that define γ-mutually unbiased bases with γ = 1/2 − δ/4. Moreover, all
theses unitaries can be performed by a quantum circuit that consists of single-qubit
Hadamard gates on a subset of the qubits. Theorem 2.14 with ` = (1− δ/2)n/4− 2 and
error ′ gives |S| ≤ 2c log(n/′) permutations {Py}y∈S of {0, 1}n that define an (n, `) 7→′
(1 − δ/2)` extractor and are computable by classical circuits of size O(npolylog(n/)).
We now argue that this classical circuit can be used to build a quantum circuit of size
O(npolylog n) that computes the unitaries Py.
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|x〉
|0〉
|0〉
CP
|x〉
|0〉
|P (x)〉
|0〉
|0〉
|P (x)〉
(CP−1)
−1
|P (x)〉
|x〉
Fig. 1. Quantum circuit to compute the permutation P using quantum circuits CP for P and CP−1 for
P−1. (CP−1 )−1 is simply the circuit CP−1 taken backwards. The bottom register is an ancilla register.
Given classical circuits that compute P and P−1, we can construct reversible circuits
CP and CP−1 for P and P−1. The circuit CP when given input (x, 0) outputs the binary
string (x, P (x)), so that it keeps the input x. Such a circuit can readily be transformed
into a quantum circuit that acts on the computational basis states as the classical
circuit. We also call these circuits CP and CP−1 . Observe that we want to compute the
unitary P , so we have to erase the input x. For this, we combine the circuits CP and
CP−1 as described in Figure 1. Note that the size of this quantum circuit is the same as
the size of the original classical circuit up to some multiplicative constant. Thus, this
quantum circuit has size O(npolylog(n/)).
The unitaries {U0, . . . , Ut−1} are obtained by taking all the possible products PyVj
for j ∈ [r], y ∈ S. Note that t = r|S|. We now show that the set {U0, . . . , Ut−1} satisfies
the uncertainty relation property. Using Lemma 2.12, for any state |ψ〉, the set
T|ψ〉 :=
{
j : ∃qj ,∆
(
pVj |ψ〉, qj
) ≤ ′ and Hmin(qj) ≥ (1− δ/2)n/4− 2}
has size at least (1 − ′)r. Moreover, for all a ∈ [dA], pAPyVi|ψ〉(a) =
∑
b |〈a|〈b|PyVi|ψ〉|2 =
P
{
PEy (X) = a
}
where X has distribution pVi|ψ〉. By definition, for i ∈ T|ψ〉, we have
∆
(
pVi|ψ〉, qi
) ≤ ′ with Hmin(qi) ≥ (1 − δ/2)n/4 − 2. Using the fact that {PEy } is a
strong extractor (see (18)) for min-entropy (1− δ/2)n/4− 2, it follows from the triangle
inequality that
1
|S|
∑
y∈S
∆
(
pAPyVi|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ 2′
for all i ∈ T|ψ〉. As |T|ψ〉| ≥ (1− ′)r, we obtain
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ 3′ = /2.
To conclude, we show that t can be taken to be a power of two at the cost of multiplying
the error by at most two. In fact, let p be the smallest integer satisfying t ≤ 2p, so that
2p ≤ 2t. By choosing an arbitrary subset of 2p − t unitaries and duplicating them, we
obtain a set of 2p unitaries. It is easily seen that we obtain an -metric uncertainty
relation with 2p unitaries from an /2-metric uncertainty relation with t unitaries.
Note that the B system we obtain is quite large and to get strong uncertainty
relations, we want the system B to be as small as possible. For this, it is possible
to repeat the construction of the previous theorem on the B system. The next theorem
gives a construction where the A system is composed of n − O(log log n) − O(log(1/))
qubits. Of course, this is at the expense of increasing the number of unitaries in the
uncertainty relation.
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A1
B1 = A2B2
A2
B2
U
(1)
k1 U
(2)
k2
B0
Fig. 2. Composition of the construction of Theorem 2.15: In order to reduce the dimension of the B system,
we can re-apply the uncertainty relation to the B system.
THEOREM 2.16 (EXPLICIT UNCERTAINTY RELATION: MESSAGE LENGTH OPTIMIZED).
Let n be a positive integer and  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) where c′ is a constant independent of n.
Then, there exist t ≤ (n )c logn (for some constant c independent of n and ) unitary trans-
formations U0, . . . , Ut−1 acting on n qubits that are all computable by quantum circuits
of size O(n polylog(n/)) such that: if A represents the first n−O(log log n)−O(log(1/))
qubits and B represents the remaining qubits, then for all |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ . (19)
Moreover, the mapping that takes the index k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs
the state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by a classical precomputation with polynomial runtime
and a quantum circuit of size O(n polylog(n/)). The number of unitaries t can be taken
to be a power of two.
Remark. Later in Theorem 4.3, we will need to apply different Uk ’s in superposition.
In this case, to analyze the size of the quantum circuit, we need to bound the running
time of the classical computation that describes the quantum circuit for Uk given k.
For this, it is simpler to use the mutually unbiased bases construction of Lemma 2.10,
for which we can bound this running time by O(n2 polylog n).
PROOF. Using the construction of Theorem 2.15, we obtain a system A over which
we have some uncertainty relation and a system B that we do not control. In order
to decrease the dimension of the system B, we can apply the same construction to
that system. The system B then gets decomposed into A2B2, and we know that the
distribution of the measurement outcomes of system A2 in the computational basis is
close to uniform. As a result, we obtain an uncertainty relation on the system AA2 (see
Figure 2).
More precisely, we start by demonstrating a simple property about the composition
of metric uncertainty relations. Note that this composition is different from the one
described in (9), but the proof is quite similar.
Claim. Suppose the set {U (1)0 , . . . , U (1)t1−1} of unitaries on A1B1 satisfies a (t1, 1)-
metric uncertainty relation on system A1 and the {U (2)0 , . . . , U (2)t2−1} of unitaries on
B1 = A2B2 satisfies a (t2, 2)-metric uncertainty relation on A2. Then the set of
unitaries
{
(1 A1 ⊗ U (2)k2 ) · U
(1)
k1
}
k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2]
satisfies a (t1t2, 1 + 2)-metric uncertainty
relation on A1A2: for all |ψ〉 ∈ A1A2B2,
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2∈[t1]×[t2]
∆
(
p
U
(2)
k2
U
(1)
k1
|ψ〉,unif([dA1dA2 ])
)
≤ 1 + 2.
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We now prove the claim. For a fixed value of k1 ∈ [t1] and a1 ∈ [dA1 ],
we can apply the second uncertainty relation to the state 〈a1|
A1Uk1 |ψ〉
‖〈a1|A1Uk1 |ψ〉‖2
=
1√
p
A1
Uk1
|ψ〉(a1)
∑
b1
(〈a1|〈b1|Uk1 |ψ〉) |b1〉 ∈ B1 = A2B2. As {|b1〉}b1 = {|a2〉|b2〉}a2,b2 , we have
1
t2
∑
k2
∑
a2
∣∣∣∣∣ 1pA1Uk1 |ψ〉(a1)
∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(1 A1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1 |ψ〉|2 −
1
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2.
We can then calculate, in the same vein as (10)
1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(1 A1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1 |ψ〉|2 −
1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
t1t2
∑
k1,k2
∑
a1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
b2
|〈a1|A1〈a2|A2〈b2|B2(1 A1 ⊗ Uk2)Uk1 |ψ〉|2 −
pA1Uk1 |ψ〉(a1)
dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
t1
∑
k1
∑
a1,a2
∣∣∣∣∣p
A1
Uk1 |ψ〉(a1)
dA2
− 1
dA1dA2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
t1
∑
k1
∑
a1
pA1Uk1 |ψ〉(a1)2 + 1
≤ 2 + 1.
This completes the proof of the claim.
To obtain the claimed dimensions, we compose the construction of Theorem 2.15 h
times with an error parameter ′ = /h and δ = 1/2. Starting with a space of n qubits,
the dimension of the B system (after one step) can be bounded by
7
8
n ≤ log dB ≤ 7
8
n+O(1).
So after h steps, we have
(7/8)
h
n ≤ log dBh ≤ (7/8)h n+O(1).
Note that h cannot be arbitrarily large: in order to apply the construction of Theorem
2.15 on a system of m qubits with error ′, we should have ′ ≥ 2−c′m. In other words,
if
log dBh ≥
1
c′
log(h/), (20)
then we can apply the construction h times. Let c′′ be a constant to be chosen later and
h =
⌊
1
log(8/7) (log n− log(c′′ log log n+ c′′ log(1/)))
⌋
. First, this choice of h satisfies (20):
log dBh ≥ c′′ log log n+ c′′ log(1/)
≥ 1
c′
log(h/)
if c′′ is chosen large enough. Moreover, we get
log dBh = 2
− logn · 2logO(log logn+log(1/)) · n = O(log log n+ log(1/))
as stated in the theorem.
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Each unitary of the obtained uncertainty relation is a product of h unitaries each
obtained from Theorem 2.15. The overall number of unitaries is the product of the
number of unitaries for each of the h steps. As a result, we have t ≤ (n )c logn for
some constant c. t can be taken to be a power of two as the number of unitaries at
each step can be taken to be a power of two. As for the running time, every unitary
transformation of the uncertainty relation can be computed by a quantum circuit of
size O(npolylog n) as it is a product of O(log n) unitaries each computed by a quantum
circuit of size O(npolylog n).
It is of course possible to obtain a trade-off between the key size and the dimension
of the B system by choosing the number of times the construction of Theorem 2.15
is applied. For example, in the next corollary, we choose the number of repetitions
of the construction of Theorem 2.15 so that we get an average entropy of (1 − )n
while keeping the number of unitaries polynomial. Note that if we are concerned
with (Shannon) entropic uncertainty relations, there is not much to be gained from
repeating the construction nΩ(logn) times as in Theorem 2.16 because we always lose a
multiplicative factor (1− ) from Fannes’ inequality.
COROLLARY 2.17 (EXPLICIT ENTROPIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS). Let n ≥ 100
be an integer, and  ∈ (10n−1/2, 1). Then, there exists t ≤ (n )c log(1/) (for some constant
c independent of n and ) unitary transformations U0, . . . , Ut−1 acting on n qubits that
are all computable by quantum circuits of size O(npolylog n) satisfying an entropic
uncertainty relation: for all pure states |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− 2)n− h2() (21)
where h2 is the binary entropy function. Moreover, the mapping that takes the index
k ∈ [t] and a state |ψ〉 as inputs and outputs the state Uk|ψ〉 can be performed by
a classical precomputation with polynomial runtime and a quantum circuit of size
O(npolylog(n/)). The number of unitaries t can be taken to be a power of two.
PROOF. The proof is basically the same as the proof of Theorem 2.16, except that
we repeat the construction h = Θ(log(1/)/ log(8/7)) times. We thus have
log dBh ≤ (7/8)h n+O(1) ≤ n.
We obtain a set of t ≤ (n )c log(1/) unitary transformations. Applying Proposition 2.2,
we get
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
H(pUk|ψ〉) ≥ (1− )(1− )n− h2()
≥ (1− 2)n− h2().
3. LOCKING CLASSICAL INFORMATION IN QUANTUM STATES
Outline of the section. We apply the results on metric uncertainty relations of the
previous section to obtain locking schemes. After an introductory section on locking
classical correlations (Section 3.1), we show how to obtain a locking scheme using
a metric uncertainty relation in Section 3.2. Using the constructions of the previous
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section, this leads to locking schemes presented in Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5. In Section
3.3, we show how to construct quantum hiding fingerprints by locking a classical
fingerprint. In Section 3.4, we observe that these locking schemes can be used to
construct efficient string commitment protocols. Section 3.5 discusses the link to
locking entanglement of formation.
3.1. Background
Locking of classical correlations was first described in [DiVincenzo et al. 2004]
as a violation of the incremental proportionality of the maximal classical mutual
information that can be obtained by local measurement on a bipartite state. More
precisely, for a bipartite state ωAB , the maximum classical mutual information Ic is
defined by
Ic(A;B)ω = max{MAi },{MBi }
I(IA; IB),
where {MAi } and {MBi } are measurements on A and B, and IA, IB are the (random)
outcomes of these measurements on the state ωAB . Incremental proportionality is the
intuitive property that ` bits of communication between two parties can increase their
mutual information by at most ` bits. DiVincenzo et al. [2004] considered the states
ωXKC =
1
2d
1∑
k=0
d−1∑
x=0
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U†k)C (22)
for k ∈ {0, 1} where U0 = 1 and U1 is the Hadamard transform. It was shown by
DiVincenzo et al. [2004] that the classical mutual information Ic(XK;C)ω = 12 log d.
However, if the holder of the C system also knows the value of k, then we can represent
the global state by the following density operator
ωXKCK
′
=
1
2d
1∑
k=0
d−1∑
x=0
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U†k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K
′
.
It is easy to see that Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = 1 + log d. This means that with only one bit
of communication (represented by the register K ′), the classical mutual information
between systems XK and C jumped from 12 log d to 1 + log d. In other words, it is
possible to unlock 12 log d bits of information (about X) from the quantum system C
using a single bit.
Hayden et al. [2004] proved an even stronger locking result. They generalize the
state in equation (22) to
ωXKC =
1
td
d−1∑
x=0
t−1∑
k=0
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ (Uk|x〉〈x|U†k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K
′
(23)
where Uk are chosen independently at random according to the Haar measure. They
show that for any  > 0, by taking t = (log d)3 and if d is large enough,
Ic(X;C)ω ≤  log d and Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = log d+ log t
with high probability. Note that the size of the key measured in bits is only log t =
O(log log d) and it should be compared to the (1 − ) log d bits of unlocked (classical)
information. It should be noted that their argument is probabilistic, and it does not say
how to construct the unitary transformations Uk. It is worth stressing that standard
derandomization techniques are not known to work in this setting. For example,
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unitary t-designs use far too many bits of randomness [Dankert et al. 2009]. Moreover,
using a δ-biased subset of the set of Pauli matrices fails to produce a locking scheme
unless the subset has a size of the order of the dimension d [Ambainis and Smith 2004;
Desrosiers and Dupuis 2010] (see Appendix D).
Here, we view locking as a cryptographic task in which a message is encoded into
a quantum state using a key whose size is much smaller than the message. Having
access to the key, one can decode the message. However, an eavesdropper who does not
have access to the key and has complete uncertainty about the message can extract
almost no classical information about the message. We should stress here that this is
not a composable cryptographic task, namely because an eavesdropper could choose to
store quantum information about the message instead of measuring. In fact, as shown
in [Ko¨nig et al. 2007], using the communicated message X as a key for a one-time pad
encryption might not be secure; see also [Dupuis et al. 2010].
One could compare a locking scheme to an entropically secure encryption scheme
[Russell and Wang 2002; Dodis and Smith 2005]. These two schemes achieve the same
task of encrypting a high entropy message using a small key. The security definition
of a locking scheme is strictly stronger. In fact, for a classical eavesdropper (i.e.,
an eavesdropper that can only measure) an -locking scheme is secure in a strong
sense. This additional security guarantee comes at the cost of upgrading classical
communication to quantum communication. With respect to quantum entropically
secure encryption [Desrosiers 2009; Desrosiers and Dupuis 2010], the security
condition of a locking scheme is also more stringent (see Appendix D for an example of
an entropically secure encryption scheme that is not -locking). However, a quantum
entropically secure scheme allows the encryption of quantum states.
Nonetheless, we note that an -locking scheme hides the message in a stronger
sense if the adversary is limited to a small quantum memory. In fact, using the same
technique as [Hallgren et al. 2010, Corollary 2] based on [Radhakrishnan et al. 2009],
if the adversary is allowed to store m qubits, then the joint state of the message and
the knowledge of the adversary is (c2m)-close to a product state for some universal
constant c. For example, if m = O(log n), then a key of logarithmic size can still be
used. This is especially interesting for the scheme presented in Corollary 3.5 below,
for which the sender and the receiver do not use any quantum memory. One could
then use such a scheme for key distribution in the bounded quantum storage model,
where the adversary is only allowed to have a quantum memory of logarithmic size
in n and an arbitrarily large classical memory. Note that even though this is a strong
assumption compared to the unconditional security of BB84 [Bennett and Brassard
1984], one advantage of such a protocol for key distribution is that it only uses one-
way communication between the two parties. In contrast, the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol needs interaction between the two parties.
Definition 3.1 (-locking scheme). Let n be a positive integer, ` ∈ [0, n] and  ∈ [0, 1].
An encoding E : [2n] × [t] → S(C) is said to be (`, )-locking for the quantum system C
if:
— For all x 6= x′ ∈ [2n] and all k ∈ [t], ∆(E(x, k), E(x′, k)) = 1.
— Let X (the message) be a random variable on [2n] with min-entropy Hmin(X) ≥
`, and K (the key) be an independent uniform random variable on [t]. For any
measurement {Mi} on C and any outcome i,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ . (24)
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where I is the outcome of measurement {Mi} on the (random) quantum state
E(X,K).
When the min-entropy bound ` is not specified, it should be understood that ` = n
meaning that X is uniformly distributed on [2n]. The state E(x, k) for x ∈ [2n] and
k ∈ [t] is referred to as the ciphertext.
Remark. The relevant parameters of a locking scheme are: the number of bits n
of the (classical) message, the dimension d of the (quantum) ciphertext, the number
t of possible values of the key and the error . Strictly speaking, a classical one-time
pad encryption, for which t = 2n, is (0, 0)-locking according to this definition. However,
here we seek locking schemes for which t is much smaller than 2n, say polynomial in
n. This cannot be achieved using a classical encryption scheme.
Note that we used the statistical distance between pX|[I=i] and pX instead of the
mutual information between X and I to measure the information gained about X from
a measurement. Using the trace distance is a stronger requirement as demonstrated
by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Let  ∈ [0, 1) and E : [2n] × [t] → S(C) be an -locking scheme.
Define the state
ωXKCK
′
=
1
td
t−1∑
k=0
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ E(x, k)C ⊗ |k〉〈k|K′ .
Then,
Ic(X;C)ω ≤ n+ h2() and Ic(XK;CK ′)ω = n+ log t
where h2() = − log()− (1− ) log(1− ).
PROOF. First, we can suppose that the measurement performed on the system X
is in the basis {|x〉}x. In fact, the outcome distribution of any measurement on the X
system can be simulated classically using the values of the random variables X.
Now let I be the outcome of a measurement performed on the C system. Using
Fannes’ inequality, we have for any i
H(X)−H(X|I = i) ≤ ∆(pX , pX|[I=i])n− h2 (∆(pX , pX|[I=i]))
≤ n+ h2()
using the fact that E defines an -locking scheme. Thus,
I(X; I) = H(X)−
∑
i
P {I = i}H(X|I = i)
≤ n+ h2().
As this holds for any measurement, we get Ic(X;C)ω ≤ n+ h2().
The trace distance was also used in [Dupuis 2010; Dupuis et al. 2010] to define
a locking scheme. To measure the leakage of information about X caused by a
measurement, they used the trace distance between the joint distribution of p(X,I)
and the product distribution pX×pI . Note that our definition is stronger, in that for all
outcomes of the measurement i, ∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤  whereas the definition of [Dupuis
et al. 2010] says that this only holds on average over i. To the best of our knowledge,
even the existence of such a strong locking scheme with small key was unknown.
For a survey on locking classical correlations, see [Leung 2009].
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3.2. Locking using a metric uncertainty relation
The following theorem shows that a locking scheme can easily be constructed using a
metric uncertainty relation.
THEOREM 3.3. Let  ∈ (0, 1) and {U0, . . . , Ut−1} be a set of unitary transformations
of A⊗B that satisfies an -metric uncertainty relation on A, i.e., for all states |ψ〉 ∈ AB,
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
∆
(
pAUk|ψ〉,unif([dA])
)
≤ .
Assume dA = 2n. Then, the mapping E : [2n]× [t]→ S(AB) defined by
E(x, k) = 1
dB
dB−1∑
b=0
U†k
(|x〉〈x|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B)Uk.
is -locking. Moreover, for all ` ∈ [0, n] such that 2`−n > , it is (`, 2
2`−n− )-locking.
Remark. The state that the encoder inputs in the B system is simply private
randomness. The encoder chooses a uniformly random b ∈ [dB ] and sends the quantum
state U†k |x〉A|b〉B . Note that b does not need to be part of the key (i.e., shared with
the receiver). This makes the dimension d = dAdB of the ciphertext larger than the
number of possible messages 2n. If one insists on having a ciphertext of the same size
as the message, it suffices to consider b as part of the message and apply a one-time
pad encryption to b. The number of possible values taken by the key increases to t · dB .
PROOF. First, it is clear that different messages are distinguishable. In fact, for
x 6= x′ and any k,
∆(E(x, k), E(x′, k)) = 1
2
tr
√|x〉〈x|A ⊗ 1 B
dB
− |x′〉〈x′|A ⊗ 1
B
dB
 = 1.
We now prove the locking property. Let X be the random variable representing the
message. Assume that X is uniformly distributed over some set S ⊆ [dA] of size
|S| ≥ 2`. Let K be a uniformly random key in [t] that is independent of X. Consider
a POVM {Mi} on the system AB. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the
POVM elements Mi have rank 1. Otherwise, by writing Mi in its eigenbasis, we could
decompose outcome i into more outcomes that can only reveal more information. So we
can write the elements as weighted rank one projectors: Mi = ξi|ei〉〈ei| where ξi > 0.
Our objective is to show that the outcome I of this measurement on the state E(X,K)
is almost independent of X. More precisely, for a fixed measurement outcome I = i,
we want to compare the conditional distribution pX|[I=i] with pX . The trace distance
between these distributions can be written as
1
2
dA−1∑
x=0
∣∣P {X = x|I = i} −P {X = x} ∣∣. (25)
Towards this objective, we start by computing the distribution of the measurement
outcome I, given the value of the message X = x (note that the receiver does not know
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the key):
P {I = i|X = x} = ξi
tdB
t−1∑
k=0
dB−1∑
b=0
tr
[
Uk|ei〉〈ei|U†k · |x〉〈x|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B
]
=
ξi
tdB
t−1∑
k=0
dB−1∑
b=0
〈x|A〈b|BUk|ei〉〈ei|U†k |x〉A|b〉B
=
ξi
tdB
t−1∑
k=0
dB−1∑
b=0
∣∣〈x|A〈b|BUk|ei〉∣∣2
=
ξi
dB
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
pAUk|ei〉(x).
Since X is uniformly distributed over S, we have that for all x ∈ S
P {X = x|I = i} = P {X = x}P {I = i|X = x}∑
x′∈S P {X = x′}P {I = i|X = x′}
=
(1/t) ·∑k pAUk|ei〉(x)
(1/t) ·∑x′∈S∑k pAUk|ei〉(x′) . (26)
Observe that in the case where X is uniformly distributed over [2n] (S = [2n]), it is
simple to obtain directly that
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
)
=
1
2
dA−1∑
x=0
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t−1∑
k=0
pAUk|ei〉(x)−
1
2n
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
using the fact that {Uk} satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on A. Now let S be any
set of size at least 2` and let α = 1t
∑
x′∈S
∑
k p
A
Uk|ei〉(x
′). We then bound
1
2
dA−1∑
x=0
∣∣P {X = x|I = i} −P {X = x} ∣∣ = 1
2
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣ (1/t) ·
∑
k p
A
Uk|ei〉(x)
α
− 1|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2α
·
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t−1∑
k=0
pAUk|ei〉(x)−
α
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2α
· 1
t
∑
k
(∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ 12n − α|S|
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We now use the fact that {Uk} satisfies a metric uncertainty relation on A: we get
1
t
∑
k
1
2
∑
x∈S
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1t∑
k
1
2
∑
x∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣pAUk|ei〉(x)− 12n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
and
1
2
∣∣∣∣ |S|2n − α
∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣ |S|2n − 1t ∑
x′∈S
t−1∑
k=0
pAUk|ei〉(x
′)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (27)
As a result, we have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 2
α
.
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Using (27), we have α ≥ |S|2−n −  ≥ 2`−n − . If  < 2`−n, we get
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 2
2`−n −  .
In the general case when X has min-entropy `, the distribution of X can be seen as a
mixture of uniform distributions over sets of size at least 2`. So there exist independent
random variables J ∈ N and {Xj} uniformly distributed on sets of size at least 2` such
that X = XJ . One can then write
1
2
∑
x
|P {X = x|I = i} −P {X = x}|
=
1
2
∑
x,j
|P {J = j} (P {Xj = x|I = i, J = j} −P {Xj = x|J = j})|
≤ 2
2`−n −  .
Using Theorem 3.3 together with the existence of metric uncertainty relations
(Theorem 2.5), we show the existence of -locking schemes whose key size depends
only on  and not on the size of the encoded message. This result was not previously
known.
COROLLARY 3.4 (EXISTENCE OF LOCKING SCHEMES). Let n be a large enough
integer and  ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists an -locking scheme encoding an n-bit message
using a key of at most 2 log(1/) +O(log log(1/)) bits into at most n+ 2 log(18/) qubits.
Remark. Observe that in terms of number of bits, the size of the key is only a factor
of two larger (up to smaller order terms) than the lower bound of log(1/( + 2−n))
bits that can be obtained by guessing the key. In fact, consider the strategy of
performing the decoding operation corresponding to the key value 0. In this case, we
have P {X = i|I = i} ≥ P {K = 0} = 1/t. Thus, ∆(pX|I=i, pX) ≥ 1/t− 2−n.
Recall that we can increase the size of the message to be equal to the number of
qubits of the ciphertext. The key size becomes at most 4 log(1/) +O(log(log(1/)).
PROOF. Use the construction of Theorem 2.5 with dA = 2n and dB = 2q such
that 2q−1 < 9/2 ≤ 2q and d = dAdB . Take t = 2p to be the power of two with
2p−1 ≤ 4·18c log(9/)2 < 2p.
The following corollary gives explicit locking schemes. We mention the constructions
based on Theorems 2.15 and 2.16. Of course, one could obtain a tradeoff between the
key size and the dimension of the quantum system.
COROLLARY 3.5 (EXPLICIT LOCKING SCHEMES). Let δ > 0 be a constant, n be a
positive integer,  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) (c′ is a constant independent of n).
— Then, there exists an efficient -locking scheme encoding an n-bit message in a
quantum state of n′ ≤ (4 + δ)n + O(log(1/)) qubits using a key of size O(log(n/))
bits. In fact, both the encoding and decoding operations are computable using a
classical computation with polynomial running time and a quantum circuit with
only Hadamard gates and preparations and measurements in the computational
basis.
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— There also exists an efficient -locking scheme E ′ encoding an n-bit message in a
quantum state of n qubits using a key of size O(log(n/) · log n) bits. E ′ is computable
by a classical algorithm with polynomial runtime and a quantum circuit of size
O(npolylog(n/)).
PROOF. For the first result, we observe that the construction of Theorem 3.3 encodes
the message in the computational basis. Recall that the untaries Uk of Theorem 2.15
are of the form Uk = PkVk where Pk is a permutation of the computational basis.
Hence, it is possible to classically compute the label of the computational basis element
P †k |x〉|b〉. One can then prepare the state P †k |x〉|b〉 and apply the unitary V †k to obtain the
ciphertext. The decoding is performed in a similar way. One first applies the unitary
Vk, measures in the computational basis and then applies the permutation Pk to the
n-bit string corresponding to the outcome.
For the second construction, we apply Theorem 2.16 with n′ = n +
c′ dlog log n+ log(1/)e for some large enough constant c′. We can then use a one-time
pad encryption on the input to the B system. This increases the size of the key by only
c′ dlog log n+ log(1/)e bits.
As mentioned earlier (see equation (22)), explicit states that exhibit locking
behaviour have been presented in [DiVincenzo et al. 2004]. However, this is the first
explicit construction of states ω that achieves the following strong locking behaviour:
for any δ > 0, for n large enough, the state ωXCK satisfies Ic(X;C)ω ≤ δ and
Ic(X;CK)ω = n + log dK where K is a classical O(log(n/δ))-bit system. This is a
direct consequence of Corollary 3.5 taking  = δ/(20n), and Proposition 3.2. We should
also mention that Ko¨nig et al. [2007] explicitly construct a state exhibiting locking
behaviour where the key is large but the stronger condition Ic(XK;C)ω ≤ δ is satisfied.
3.3. Quantum hiding fingerprints
In this section, we show that the locking scheme of Corollary 3.4 can be used to build
mixed state quantum hiding fingerprints as defined by Gavinsky and Ito [2010]. A
quantum fingerprint [Buhrman et al. 2001] encodes an n-bit string into a quantum
state ρx of n′  n qubits such that given y ∈ {0, 1}n and the fingerprint ρx, it is
possible to decide with small error probability whether x = y. The additional hiding
property ensures that measuring ρx leaks very little information about x. Here, we
prove that such a hiding fingerprint can be obtained by locking a classical fingerprint.
The hiding property is then a direct consequence of the locking property. In order to
prove the fingerprinting property, we use the mutually unbiased property of the bases
involved in the scheme of Corollary 3.4.
Gavinsky and Ito [2010] used the accessible information2 as a measure of the
hiding property. Here, we strengthen this definition by imposing a bound on the total
variation distance instead (see Proposition 2.2).
Definition 3.6 (Quantum hiding fingerprint). Let n be a positive integer, δ,  ∈ (0, 1)
and C be a Hilbert space. An encoding f : {0, 1}n → S(C) together with a set of
measurements {My, 1 −My} for each y ∈ {0, 1}n is a (δ, )-hiding fingerprint if
(1) (Fingerprint property) For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, tr [Mxf(x)] = 1 and for y 6= x,
tr [Myf(x)] ≤ δ.
2The accessible information about X in a quantum system C refers to the maximum over all measurements
of the system C of I(X; I) where I is the outcome of that measurement.
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(2) (Hiding property) Let X be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n. Then, for any POVM
{Ni} on the system C whose outcome on f(X) is denoted I, we have for all possible
outcomes i,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ .
We usually want the Hilbert space C to be composed of O(log n) qubits. Gavinsky
and Ito [2010] proved that for any constant c, there exists efficient quantum hiding
fingerprinting schemes for which the number of qubits in the system C is O(log n) and
both the error probability δ and the accessible information are bounded by 1/nc. Here,
we prove that the same result can be obtained by locking a classical fingerprint. The
general structure of our quantum hiding fingerprint for parameters n, δ and  is as
follows:
(1) Choose a random prime p ∈ Pn,,δ uniformly from the set Pn,,δ.
(2) Set t =
⌈
c log(1/)−2
⌉
, dA = p and dB =
⌈
c′/2
⌉
and generate t random unitaries
Up0 , . . . , U
p
t−1 acting on A⊗B.
(3) The fingerprint consists of the random prime p and the state (Upk )
†|x mod p〉A|b〉B
where k ∈ [t] and b ∈ [dB ] are chosen uniformly and independently. The density
operator representing this state is denoted f(x) := 1tdB
∑
k,b(U
p
k )
†|x mod p〉〈x mod
p|A|b〉〈b|BUpk .
Observe that even though this protocol is randomized because the unitaries are chosen
at random, it is possible to implement it with polynomial resources in n as the size of
the message to be locked is O(log n) bits. In fact, one can approximately sample a
random unitary in dimension 2O(logn) using a polynomial number of public random
bits. The mixed state protocol of [Gavinsky and Ito 2010] achieves roughly the same
parameters. Their construction is also randomized but it uses random codes instead
of random unitaries. For this reason, the protocol of [Gavinsky and Ito 2010] would
probably be more efficient in practice.
THEOREM 3.7. There exist constants c, c′ and c′′, such that for all positive integer
n, δ,  ∈ (0, 1/4) if we define Pn,δ, to be the set of primes in the interval [l, u] where
l =
(
c′′
δ
· log
2(1/)
8
)1/0.9
+ 10n and u = l + (2n/δ)2
and provided u ≤ 2n−2, the scheme described above is a (δ, )-hiding fingerprint with
probability 1− 2−Ω(n) over the choice of random unitaries.
The proof of this result involves two parts. First, we need to show that the fingerprint of
a uniformly distributedX ∈ {0, 1}n does not give away much information aboutX. This
follows easily from Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 3.3. We also need to show that for every
y ∈ {0, 1}n, there is a measurement that Bob can apply to the fingerprint to determine
with high confidence whether it corresponds to a fingerprint of y or not. In order to
prove this, we use the following proposition on the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalisation
of a set of almost orthogonal vectors.
PROPOSITION 3.8. Let v′1, . . . , v′r be a sequence of unit length vectors in a Hilbert
space. Let 0 < δ ≤ 116r . For any i 6= j, suppose |〈v′i|v′j〉| ≤ δ. Let v1, . . . , vr be
the corresponding sequence of vectors obtained by Gram-Schmidt orthonormalising
v′1, . . . , v
′
r. Then for any i, ‖vi − v′i‖2 ≤ δ
√
32(i− 1).
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PROOF. Since |〈v′i|v′j〉| < δ < 1/r for any i 6= j, the vectors v′1, . . . , v′r are linearly
independent. Define Π0 to be the zero linear operator. For i ≥ 1, define Πi to be the
orthogonal projection onto the subspace spanned by the vectors v′1, . . . , v′i. Observe that
for any i, v′1, . . . , v′i and v1, . . . , vi span the same space, and vi+1 =
v′i+1−Πi(v′i+1)
‖v′i+1−Πi(v′i+1)‖2 . We
shall prove by induction on i that ‖Πi(v′k)‖2 ≤ 4δ
√
i for all i and all k > i. This will
prove the desired statement since
‖vi − v′i‖22 = ‖Πi−1(v′i)‖22 + (1− ‖v′i −Πi−1(v′i)‖2)2
= ‖Πi−1(v′i)‖22 +
(
1−
√
1− ‖Πi−1(v′i)‖22
)2
= 2− 2
√
1− ‖Πi−1(v′i)‖22 ≤ 2− 2
√
1− 16δ2(i− 1)
≤ 32δ2(i− 1).
For the first equality, we write v′i = Πi−1(v′i) + ‖v′i −Πi−1(v′i)‖2 vi and we use the fact
that Πi−1(v′i) and vi are orthogonal.
The base case of i = 1 is trivial. Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for
a particular i. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ i + 1 and k > i + 1. Observe that v′j = Πj−1(v′j) +√
1− ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖22 vj . We have
|〈v′k|v′j〉| =
∣∣∣〈v′k|Πj−1(v′j)〉+√1− ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖22 〈v′k|vj〉∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣〈Πj−1(v′k)|Πj−1(v′j)〉+√1− ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖22 〈v′k|vj〉∣∣∣
≥
√
1− ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖22 |〈v′k|vj〉| − ‖Πj−1(v′k)‖2 ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖2,
which implies that
|〈v′k|vj〉| ≤
|〈v′k|v′j〉|+ ‖Πj−1(v′k)‖2 ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖2√
1− ‖Πj−1(v′j)‖22
≤ δ + 16δ
2(j − 1)√
1− 16δ2(j − 1) ≤
δ + δ√
1− δ
≤ 4δ.
Thus, ‖Πi+1(v′k)‖22 =
∑i+1
j=1 |〈v′k|vj〉|2 ≤ 16δ2(i + 1), which gives ‖Πi+1(v′k)‖2 ≤ 4δ
√
i+ 1
completing the induction.
Using this result we can prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.9. Let {U0, . . . , Ut−1} be a set of unitary transformations on AB that
define γ-MUBs and d−γ/2 ≤ 1/(16tdB) where d := dAdB . Define for y ∈ [dA] the subspace
Fy = span{U†k |y〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈ [dB ]}. Then for any x ∈ [dA], y 6= x, k0 ∈ [t] and b0 ∈ [dB ],
tr
[
ΠFyU
†
k0
|x〉|b0〉
]
≤ 2
√
32(tdB)
2d−γ .
where ΠF is the projector on the subspace F .
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PROOF. Consider the set of vectors {U†k |y〉|b〉}k∈[t],b∈[dB ]. We have for all (k, b) 6=
(k′, b′),
|〈y|〈b′|Uk′U†k |y〉|b〉| ≤ d−γ/2.
Picking any fixed ordering on [t] × [dB ], define {|ek,b(y)〉}k,b to be the set of vectors
obtained by Gram-Schmidt orthonormalising {U†k |y〉|b〉}k∈[t],b∈[dB ]. Using Proposition
3.8, we have ‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U†k |y〉|b〉‖2 ≤ d−γ/2
√
32tdB . Thus,
tr
[
ΠFyU
†
k0
|x〉|b0〉
]
=
∑
k,b
|〈ek,b(y)|U†k0 |x〉|b0〉|2
≤
∑
k,b
∣∣∣|〈y|〈b′|Uk′U†k0 |x〉|b0〉|+ ‖|ek,b(y)〉 − U†k |y〉|b〉‖2∣∣∣2
≤ tdB · d−γ
(√
32tdB + 1
)2
≤ 2
√
32(tdB)
2d−γ .
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.7. We start by proving the hiding property. For any fixed p,
the random variable Z := X mod p is almost uniformly distributed on [p]. In fact, we
have for any z ∈ [p],P {Z = z} ≤ 2n/p+12n . In other words,Hmin(Z) ≥ log p−log(1+p2−n).
Thus, using Theorem 2.5 and Theorem 3.3, we have that except with probability
exponentially small in n (on the choice of the random unitary), the fingerprinting
scheme satisfies for any measurement outcome i
∆
(
pZ|[I=i], pZ
) ≤ 21
1+p2−n − 
≤ 4
where I denotes the outcome of a measurement on the state f(X). Recall that we are
interested in the information leakage about X not Z. For this, we note that the random
variables X,Z, I form a Markov chain. Thus,
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
)
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈[p]
P {Z = z|I = i}P {X = x|I = i, Z = z} −P {Z = z}P {X = x|Z = z}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈[p]
P {Z = z|I = i}P {X = x|Z = z} −P {Z = z}P {X = x|Z = z}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
z∈[p]
|P {Z = z|I = i} −P {Z = z}|
∑
x∈{0,1}n
P {X = x|Z = z}
= ∆
(
pZ|[I=i], pZ
) ≤ 4.
This proves the hiding property.
We then analyse the fingerprint property. Let x, y ∈ [2n] and p be the random prime
of the fingerprint. We define the measurements by My = ΠFy for all y ∈ {0, 1}n where
ΠFy is the projector onto the subspace Fy = span{Upk †|y mod p〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈ [dB ]}. If
x = y, then f(x) is a mixture of states in span{Upk †|y mod p〉|b〉, k ∈ [t], b ∈ [dB ]}. Thus
tr[Myf(x)] = 1.
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We now suppose that x 6= y. First, we have for a random choice of prime p ∈ Pn,,δ,
P {x mod p = y mod p} = P {x− y mod p = 0} ≤ δ/2 as the number of distinct prime
divisors of x − y is at most n and the number of primes in [l, u] is at least 2n/δ for n
large enough. Then, whenever x mod p 6= y mod p, Lemma 3.9 with γ = 0.9 gives
tr
[
ΠFyf(x)
] ≤ 2√32(tdB)2(dAdB)−0.9
≤ 2
√
32 · 4c2c′2 log
2(1/)
8
· δ
8
c′′ log2(1/)
≤ δ/2
for c′′ large enough with probability 1 − 2−Ω(dAdB) = 1 − 2−Ω(n) over the choice of the
random unitaries (using Theorem 2.5). Finally, we get tr
[
ΠFyf(x)
] ≤ δ with probability
1− 2−Ω(n).
3.4. String commitment
In this section, we show how to use a locking scheme to obtain a weak form of
bit commitment [Buhrman et al. 2006]. Bit commitment is an important two-party
cryptographic primitive defined as follows. Consider two mutually distrustful parties
Alice and Bob who are only allowed to communicate over some channel. The objective
is to be able to achieve the following: Alice secretly chooses a bit x and communicates
with Bob to convince him that she fixed her choice, without revealing the actual bit x.
This is the commit stage. At the reveal stage, Alice reveals the secret x and enables
Bob to open the commitment. Bob can then check whether Alice was honest.
Using classical or quantum communication, unconditionally secure bit commitment
is known to be unrealizable [Mayers 1997; Lo and Chau 1997]. However, commitment
protocols with weaker security guarantees do exist [Spekkens and Rudolph 2001;
Damga˚rd et al. 2005; Buhrman et al. 2006; Buhrman et al. 2008]. Here, we consider
the string commitment scenario studied in [Buhrman et al. 2008, Section III]. In a
string commitment protocol, Alice commits to an n-bit string. Alice’s ability to cheat
is quantified by the number of strings she can reveal successfully. The ability of
Bob to cheat is quantified by the information he can obtain about the string to be
committed. One can formalize these notions in many ways. We use a security criterion
that is similar to the one of [Buhrman et al. 2008] except that we use the statistical
distance between the outcome distribution and the uniform distribution, instead of the
accessible information. Our definition is slightly stronger by virtue of Proposition 3.2.
For a detailed study of string commitment in a more general setting, see [Buhrman
et al. 2008].
Definition 3.10. An (n, α, β)-quantum bit string commitment is a quantum
communication protocol between Alice (the committer) and Bob (the receiver) which
has two phases. When both players are honest the protocol takes the following form.
— (Commit phase) Alice chooses a string X ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly. Alice and Bob
communicate, after which Bob holds a state ρX .
— (Reveal phase) Alice and Bob communicate and Bob learns X.
The parameters α and β are security parameters.
— If Alice is honest, then for any measurement performed by Bob on her state ρX , we
have ∆
(
pX , pX|[I=i]
) ≤ βn where I is the outcome of the measurement.
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— If Bob is honest, then for all commitments of Alice:
∑
x∈{0,1}n px ≤ 2α, where px is
the probability that Alice successfully reveals x.
Following the strategy of [Buhrman et al. 2008], the following protocol for string
commitment can be defined using a locking scheme E .
— Commit phase: Alice has the string X ∈ {0, 1}n and chooses a key K ∈ [t] uniformly
at random. She sends the state E(X,K) to Bob.
— Reveal phase: Alice announces both the string X and the key K. Using the key, Bob
measures some value X ′. He accepts if X = X ′.
A protocol is said to be efficient if both the communication (in terms of the number
of qubits exchanged) is polynomial in n and the computations performed by Alice and
Bob can be done in polynomial time on a quantum computer. The protocol presented in
[Buhrman et al. 2008] is not efficient in terms of computation and is efficient in terms
of communication only if the cost of communicating a (random) unitary in dimension
2n is disregarded. Using the efficient locking scheme of Corollary 3.5, we get
COROLLARY 3.11. Let n be a positive integer and β ∈ (n2−cn, n) (c is a constant
independent of n). There exists an efficient (n, c log(n2/β), β)-quantum bit string
commitment protocol for some constant c independent of n and β.
PROOF. We use the first construction of Corollary 3.5 with  = β/n. If Bob is honest,
the security analysis is exactly the same as [Buhrman et al. 2008]. If Alice is honest,
the security follows directly from the definition of the locking scheme.
3.5. Locking entanglement of formation
The entanglement of formation is a measure of the entanglement in a bipartite
quantum state that attempts to quantify the number of singlets required to produce
the state in question using only local operations and classical communication [Bennett
et al. 1996]. For a bipartite state ρXY , the entanglement of formation is defined as
Ef (X;Y )ρ = min{pi,|ψi〉}
∑
i
piH(X)ψi . (28)
where the minimization is taken over all possible ways to write ρXY =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|
with
∑
i pi = 1. Entanglement of formation is related to the following quantity:
I←(X;Y ′)ρ = max{Mi}
I(X; I)
where the maximization is taken over all measurements {Mi} performed on the system
Y ′ and I is the outcome of this measurement. Koashi and Winter [2004] showed that
for a pure state |ρ〉XY Y ′ , a simple identity holds:
Ef (X;Y )ρ + I
←(X;Y ′)ρ = H(X)ρ. (29)
Let {U0, . . . , Ut−1} be a set of unitary transformations of A⊗B ' C and define
|ρ〉ABCA′K = 1
dAdB
∑
k∈[t],a∈[dA],b∈[dB ]
|a〉A|b〉B
(
U†k |a〉 ⊗ |b〉
)C
|a〉A′ |k〉K .
If {U0, . . . , Ut−1} satisfies an -metric uncertainty relation, then we get a locking effect
using Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.2. In fact, we have I←(A;C)ρ ≤  log dA + h2()
Journal of the ACM, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:37
and I←(A;CK) = log dA. Thus, using (29), we get
Ef (A;A
′BK)ρ = H(A)ρ − I←(A;C)ρ ≥ (1− ) log dA − h2()
and discarding the system K of dimension t we obtain a separable state
Ef (A;A
′B)ρ = 0.
Explicit states for which the entanglement of formation increases by n/2 by adding a
one-bit system K have been presented in [Horodecki et al. 2005] following [DiVincenzo
et al. 2004]. Here, using Corollary 2.17, we obtain explicit examples of states where
the increase is (1 − )n by adding a system K of O(log n log(1/)) bits for arbitrarily
small .
4. QUANTUM IDENTIFICATION CODES
Consider the following quantum analogue of the equality testing communication
problem. Alice is given an n-qubit state |ψ〉 and Bob is given |ϕ〉. Namely, Bob wants to
output 1 with probability in the interval [|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2− , |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ] and 0 with probability
in the interval [1 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 − , 1 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ]. This task is referred to as quantum
identification [Winter 2004]. Note that communication only goes from Alice to Bob.
There are many possible variations to this problem. One of the interesting models is
when Alice receives the quantum state |ψ〉 and Bob gets a classical description of |ϕ〉.
An -quantum-ID code is defined by an encoder, which is a quantum operation that
maps Alice’s quantum state |ψ〉 to another quantum state which is transmitted to Bob,
and a family of decoding POVMs {Dϕ, 1 − Dϕ} for all |ϕ〉 that Bob performs on the
state he receives from Alice.
Definition 4.1 (Quantum identification [Winter 2004]). Let H1,H2, C be Hilbert
spaces and  ∈ (0, 1). An -quantum-ID code for the space C using the channel
N : S(H1) → S(H2) consists of an encoding map E : S(C) → S(H1) and a set of
POVMs {Dϕ, 1 −Dϕ} acting on S(H2), one for each pure state |ϕ〉 such that
∀|ψ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ C,
∣∣∣ tr [DϕN (E(ψ))]− |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2∣∣∣ ≤ .
Here we consider channels N transmitting noiseless qubits and noiseless classical
bits. We also say that -quantum identification of n-qubit states can be performed
using ` bits and m qubits when there exists an -quantum-ID code for the space
C = (C2)⊗n using the channel N = id⊗`2 ⊗ id⊗m2 , where id2 and id2 are the noiseless bit
and qubit channels. Hayden and Winter [2012] showed that classical communication
alone cannot be used for quantum identification. However, a small amount of quantum
communication makes classical communication useful. Specifically, they proved that
quantum identification of n-qubit states can be done using m = o(n) qubits and
` = n bits of communication. Using our metric uncertainty relations, we prove better
bounds on the number of qubits of communication and give an efficient encoder for this
problem.
Our protocol is based on a duality between quantum identification and approximate
forgetfulness of a quantum channel demonstrated in [Hayden and Winter 2012,
Theorem 7]. Specialized to our setting, the direction of the duality we use states that
if V : C → A ⊗ B defines a low-distortion embedding of (C, `2) into (AB, `A1 (`B2 )), then
the maps Γa : C → B for a ∈ [dA] defined by |ψ〉 7→
∑
b∈dB (〈a|〈b|V |ψ〉)|b〉 approximately
preserve inner products on average. The following lemma gives a precise statement.
We give an elementary proof in the interest of making the presentation self-contained.
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LEMMA 4.2. Let V : C → A⊗B be an isometry, i.e., for all |ψ〉 ∈ C, ‖V |ψ〉‖2 = ‖|ψ〉‖2.
For any vector |ψ〉 ∈ C, we define the vectors |ψa〉 ∈ B by V |ψ〉 =
∑
a∈[dA] |a〉|ψa〉. Assume
that V satisfies the following property:
∀|ψ〉 ∈ C
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖|ψ〉‖22. (30)
Then we have for all unit vectors |ψ〉, |ϕ〉 ∈ C with V |ψ〉 = ∑a∈[dA] |a〉|ψa〉 and
V |ϕ〉 = ∑a∈[dA] |a〉|ϕa〉
1
dA
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12+ 2√. (31)
PROOF. Let |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 be unit vectors in C. We use the triangle inequality to get
1
dA
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣ |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2dA‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣ . (32)
We start by dealing with the first term in (32). Observe that∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣(Re〈ψa|ϕa〉)2 − (Re〈ψ|ϕ〉)2dA
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣(Im〈ψa|ϕa〉)2 − (Im〈ψ|ϕ〉)2dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∣∣∣∣Re〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Re〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣+ 2 ∣∣∣∣Im〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Im〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣ . (33)
In the last inequality, we used the fact that |x2 − y2| ≤ 2|x − y| whenever |x + y| ≤ 2.
To bound these terms, we apply the assumption about V (equation (30)) to the vector
|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉: ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉 − |ϕa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22 ≤ 4.
By expanding ‖|ψa〉 − |ϕa〉‖22 and ‖|ψ〉 − |ϕ〉‖22, we obtain using the triangle inequality∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣2Re〈ψa|ϕa〉 − 2Re〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4+ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − ‖|ψ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖22 − ‖|ϕ〉‖22dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 6.
In the last inequality, we used equation (30) for |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉. The same argument can
be applied to i|ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 to get
2
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣Im〈ψa|ϕa〉 − Im〈ψ|ϕ〉dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 6
Thus, substituting in equation (33) we obtain∑
a
∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2dA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12.
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|ψ〉
1√
t
∑
k |k〉
Uk
Classical description of |ϕ〉
Dk,aϕ
B
A
K
k, a
Outcome
Fig. 3. Quantum identification based on a metric uncertainty relation. The system K is prepared in
a uniform superposition state 1√
t
∑
k |k〉. Then, controlled by system K, the unitary Uk is applied to
C = A⊗B, where the unitary transformations {Uk} satisfy a metric uncertainty relation. TheKA system is
then measured in its computational basis. The outcome k, a of this measurement is sent through the classical
channel. The system B is sent using the noiseless quantum channel. The receiver constructs a POVM Dk,aϕ
based on a classical description of the state |ϕ〉 he wishes to test for and the classical communication k, a he
receives.
We now consider the second term in (32). We have, using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, |〈ψa|ϕa〉|‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 ≤ 1. Hence,∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣|〈ψa|ϕa〉|2 − |〈ψa|ϕa〉|2dA‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a∈[dA]
‖|ψa〉‖2
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2√dA − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤
√ ∑
a∈[dA]
‖|ψa〉‖22
√√√√ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣2 +
√√√√ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖2 − 1√dA
∣∣∣∣2
≤
√√√√ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ϕa〉‖22 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣+
√√√√ ∑
a∈[dA]
∣∣∣∣‖|ψa〉‖22 − 1dA
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2√.
For the third inequality, we used once again the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and for
the fourth inequality, we used the fact that
∑
a∈[dA] ‖|ψa〉‖22 = ‖V |ψ〉‖22 = 1 and the
inequality |x − y|2 ≤ |x − y||x + y| = |x2 − y2| for all nonnegative x, y. Plugging this
bound into equation (32), we obtain the desired result.
THEOREM 4.3 (QUANTUM IDENTIFICATION USING CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION).
Let n be a positive integer and  ∈ (2−c′n, 1) where c′ is a constant independent of
n. Then for some m = O(log(1/)), -quantum identification of n-qubit states can be
performed using a single message of n bits and m qubits.
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Moreover, for some m = O(log(n/) · log(n)), -quantum identification of n-qubit states
can be performed using a single message of n bits and m qubits with an encoding
quantum circuit of polynomial size.
PROOF. Let {U0, . . . , Ut−1} be a set of unitaries on n qubits satisfying an ′- metric
uncertainty relation with ′ = 1/2 · (/28)2. We start by preparing the uniform
superposition 1√
t
∑t−1
k=0 |k〉K and apply the unitary Uk on system C controlled by
the register K. We get the state 1√
t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ψ〉)AB =
∑
k,a |k〉K |a〉A|ψk,a〉B for
some unnormalized vectors |ψk,a〉 ∈ B. Alice then measures the system KA in the
computational basis obtaining an outcome k, a and sends k, a and |ψˆk,a〉 to Bob, where
|ψˆk,a〉 = |ψk,a〉/‖|ψk,a〉‖2. Observe that
∑
k,a ‖|ψk,a〉‖22 = 1 and ‖|ψk,a〉‖22 = 1t · pAUk|ψ〉(a) so
that the metric uncertainty relation property can be written as
1
2
∑
k,a
∣∣∣∣‖|ψk,a〉‖22 − 1tdA
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ′. (34)
This shows that the isometry |ψ〉 7→ 1√
t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ψ〉)AB satisfies the condition (30) of
Lemma 4.2.
The decoding POVMs for received classical information k, a and state |ϕ〉 are defined
by Dk,aϕ = |ϕˆk,a〉〈ϕˆk,a| where 1√t
∑
k |k〉K(Uk|ϕ〉)AB =
∑
k,a |k〉K |a〉A|ϕk,a〉B and |ϕˆk,a〉 =
|ϕk,a〉/‖ϕk,a‖2. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 3.
We now analyse the probability that Bob outputs 1. Recall that outcome 1
corresponds to the projector |ϕ〉〈ϕ|. The probability that the protocol in Figure 3 outputs
1 is ∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22 · tr
[
Dk,aϕ |ψˆk,a〉〈ψˆk,a|
]
=
∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2.
Applying Lemma 4.2, we get
1
tdA
∑
k,a
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣ ≤ 14√2′ = /2. (35)
Using the triangle inequality, equations (35) and (34), we obtain∑
k,a
‖|ψk,a〉‖22
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣
≤
∑
k,a
1
tdA
∣∣∣|〈ψˆk,a|ϕˆk,a〉|2 − |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2∣∣∣+∑
k,a
∣∣∣∣‖|ψk,a〉‖22 − 1tdA
∣∣∣∣ · 2
≤ /2 + 4′ ≤ .
Thus, the probability of obtaining outcome 1 is in the interval [|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2− , |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2 + ].
We conclude by using the metric uncertainty relations of Theorems 2.5 and 2.16. For
the explicit construction, we still need to argue that the encoding can be computed by
a quantum circuit of size O(n2 polylog(n/)) and depth O(n polylog(n/)) using classical
precomputation. Note that we need to apply the unitaries from Theorem 2.16 in
superposition. This means that in order to obtain an efficient circuit, we need an
efficient way of mapping the integer k to a description of the circuit computing Uk.
In order to obtain the desired size for the quantum circuit, we substitue the 1-MUBs
of Lemma 2.10 in the construction of Theorem 2.16. The reason is that Lemma 2.11
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concerning approximate MUBs does not give an explicit bound on the running time of
the procedure that determines the circuit as a function of k. The only thing we need
to precompute is an irreducible polynomial of degree n over F2[X]. Then, using the
same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.10, we can compute the unitary operation
that takes as input the state |j〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 and outputs the state |j〉 ⊗ Vj |ψ〉 using a circuit
of size O(n2 polylog n) and depth O(npolylog n). Since the permutation extractor we
use can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size O(npolylog(n/)), the unitary
transformation |k〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 7→ |k〉 ⊗ Uk|ψ〉 can be computed by a quantum circuit of size
O(n2 polylog(n/)) and depth O(npolylog(n/)).
This result can be thought of as an analogue of the well-known fact that the public-
coin randomized communication complexity of equality is O(log(1/)) for an error
probability  [Kushilevitz and Nisan 1997]. Quantum communication replaces classical
communication and classical communication replaces public random bits. Classical
communication can be thought of as an extra resource because on its own it is useless
for quantum identification [Hayden and Winter 2012, Theorem 11].
5. CONCLUSION
We have seen how the problem of finding uncertainty relations is closely related to
the problem of finding large almost Euclidean subspaces of `1(`2). Even though we
did not use any norm embedding result directly, many of the ideas presented here
come from the proofs and constructions in the study of the geometry of normed
spaces. In particular, we obtained an explicit family of bases that satisfy a strong
metric uncertainty relation by adapting a construction of Indyk [2007]. Moreover,
using standard techniques from asymptotic geometric analysis, we were able to prove
a strong result on the uncertainty relations defined by random unitaries [Hayden et al.
2004].
We used these uncertainty relations to exhibit strong locking effects. In particular,
we obtained the first explicit construction of a method for encrypting a random n-
bit string in an n-qubit state using a classical key of size polylogarithmic in n.
Moreover, our non-explicit results give better key sizes than previous constructions
while simultaneously meeting a stronger locking definition. In particular, we showed
that an arbitrarily long message can be locked with a constant-sized key. Our results
on locking are summarized in Table I. We should emphasize that, even though we
presented information locking from a cryptographic point of view, it is not a composable
primitive because an eavesdropper could choose to store quantum information about
the message instead of measuring. For this reason, a locking scheme has to be used
with great care when composed with other cryptographic primitives.
We also used uncertainty relations to construct quantum identification codes. We
proved that it is possible to identify a quantum state of n qubits by communicating
n classical bits and O(log(1/)) quantum bits. We also presented an efficient encoder
for this problem that uses O(log n log(n/)) qubits of communication instead. The main
weakness of this result is that the decoder uses a classical description of the state |ϕ〉
that is in general exponential in the number of qubits of |ϕ〉. But as shown in [Winter
2004, Remark 16], if Bob was to receive a copy of the quantum state |ϕ〉, there is no
strategy for Alice that is asymptotically more efficient in terms of communication than
sending her state to Bob.
We expect to see more applications to quantum information theory of the tools used
in the theory of pseudorandomness. An interesting open question is whether these
techniques can be helpful in constructing explicit subspaces containing only highly
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entangled states. We say that a subspace S of the Hilbert space of a bipartite system
A⊗ B is a maximally entangled subspace if all states in S have a marginal on A with
almost maximal entropy. Using probabilistic arguments, Hayden et al. [2006] showed
that subspaces with this property can be surprisingly large, e.g., almost as large as
A ⊗ B if we use the von Neumann entropy. Such subspaces are related to one of the
central problems in quantum information theory: the classical capacity of a quantum
channel. Unlike for classical channels, there is no known computable formula for the
classical capacity of a general quantum channel. The main difficulty in the quantum
setting is the possibility of having entanglement between the inputs of subsequent uses
of the channel. It remained unknown for a long time whether entangled inputs can
be beneficial for the transmission of classical information, or in other words whether
the Holevo information is additive. Recently, using a probabilistic construction of a
maximally entangled subspace, Hastings [2009] constructed a channel for which the
Holevo information is not additive; see also [Hayden and Winter 2008] for violations
of related additivity questions. In a different context, maximally entangled subspaces
were also used to build protocols for superdense coding of quantum states [Harrow
et al. 2004]. These applications motivate the search for explicit constructions of
maximally entangled subspaces. As shown by Aubrun, Szarek and Werner [2010;
2011], this problem amounts to finding explicit almost Euclidean sections for matrix
spaces endowed with Schatten p-norms, which corresponds to the `p norm of the
singular values. In addition to the applications in quantum information theory, such
almost Euclidean sections are closely related to rank minimization problems for which
the nuclear norm heuristic allows exact recovery [Dvijotham and Fazel 2010].
APPENDIX
A. EXISTENCE OF METRIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS
In this section, we prove the lemmas used in Theorem 2.5.
We start with Lemma 2.6 on the average value of `A1 (`B2 ) on the sphere. Note that
using (6), the formulation here is equivalent to the original formulation.
LEMMA 2.6 (AVERAGE VALUE OF `A1 (`B2 ) ON THE SPHERE). Let |ϕ〉AB be a random
pure state on AB. Then,
E
{
‖|ϕ〉AB‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
= dA
Γ(dB +
1
2 )
Γ(dB)
Γ(dAdB)
Γ(dAdB +
1
2 )
≥
√
1− 1
dB
√
dA.
where Γ is the Gamma function Γ(z) =
∫∞
0
uz−1e−udu for z ≥ 0.
PROOF. The presentation uses methods described in [Ball 1997].
Observe that the random variable ‖|ϕ〉AB‖12 is distributed as the `dA1 (`2dB2 ) norm of
a real random vector chosen according to the rotation invariant measure on the sphere
S2dAdB−1. We define for integers n and m the norm `n1 (`m2 ) of a real n ·m-dimensional
vector {vi,j}i∈[n],j∈[m] as for the complex case (Definition 2.3)
‖v‖`n1 (`m2 ) =
∑
i
√∑
j
|vi,j |2.
Note that we only specify the dimension of the systems as the systems themselves
are not relevant here. In the rest of the proof, we use ‖ · ‖12 as a shorthand for
‖ · ‖
`
dA
1 (`
2dB )
. Our objective is to evaluate the expected value E {‖Θ‖12} where Θ has
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rotation invariant distribution on the real sphere Ss−1 and s = 2d with d = dAdB .
For this, we start by relating the E {‖Z‖12} and E {‖Θ‖12} where Z has a standard
Gaussian distribution on Rs . By changing to polar coordinates, we get
E {‖Z‖12} =
∫
Rs
‖x‖12 e
− 12
∑s
i=1 x
2
i
(2pi)s/2
dx
=
∫ ∞
0
∫
Ss−1
‖rθ‖12 e
−r2/2
(2pi)s/2
· spi
s/2dσ(θ)
Γ( s2 + 1)
rs−1dr
where σ is the normalized rotation-invariant measure on Ss−1. The term spi
s/2
Γ( s2+1)
is the
surface area of the sphere in dimension s− 1. Using the equality Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z), we
have spi
s/2
Γ( s2+1)
= 2pi
s/2
Γ( s2 )
. Thus,
E {‖Z‖12} = 2pi
s/2
(2pi)s/2Γ( s2 )
∫ ∞
0
rse−r
2/2dr ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
1
2s/2−1Γ( s2 )
∫ ∞
0
rse−r
2/2dr ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
We then perform a change of variable u = r2/2:
E {‖Z‖12} = 1
2s/2−1Γ( s2 )
∫ ∞
0
(2u)(s−1)/2e−udu ·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
2(s−1)/2Γ( s−12 + 1)
2s/2−1Γ( s2 )
·
∫
Ss−1
‖θ‖12dσ(θ)
=
√
2Γ( s+12 )
Γ( s2 )
·E {‖Θ‖12} . (36)
Now, we compute
E {‖Z‖12} =
∫
Rs
‖x‖12 e
− 12‖x‖22
(2pi)s/2
dx
=
dA∑
i=1
∫
Rs
‖xi‖2 e
− 12‖x‖22
(2pi)s/2
dx
where we decomposed x = (x1, . . . , xdA) where xi ∈ R2dB . As all the terms of the sum
are equal
E {‖Z‖12} = dA
∫
R2dB
‖x0‖2 e
− 12‖x0‖22
(2pi)dB
dx0
(∫
R2dB
e−
1
2‖x1‖22
(2pi)dB
dx1
)dA−1
= dA
√
2Γ( 2dB+12 )
Γ(dB)
∫
S2dB−1
‖θ‖2dσ(θ)
= dA
√
2Γ( 2dB+12 )
Γ(dB)
.
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To get the second equality, we use the same argument as for equation (36). We conclude
using equation (36)
E
{
‖|ϕ〉‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
= E {‖Θ‖12}
= dA
Γ(dB +
1
2 )
Γ(dB)
· Γ(dAdB)
Γ(dAdB +
1
2 )
.
We now prove the inequality in the statement of the lemma. We use the following
two facts about the Γ function: log Γ is convex and for all z > 0, Γ(z + 1) = zΓ(z). The
first property can be seen by using Ho¨lder’s inequality for example and the second
using integration by parts. Using these properties, we have
log Γ
(
x+
1
2
)
≤ 1
2
log Γ(x) +
1
2
log Γ(x+ 1)
=
1
2
log
(
xΓ(x)2
)
= log
(√
xΓ(x)
)
.
Thus, Γ(x+
1
2 )
Γ(x) ≤
√
x. Similarly, we have Γ(x)
Γ(x− 12 )
≤
√
x− 12 which implies that
Γ(x+ 12 )
Γ(x) ≥√
x− 12 when writing Γ(x+ 1/2) = (x− 1/2)Γ(x− 1/2).
We conclude that
E
{
‖|ϕ〉‖`A1 (`B2 )
}
≥ dA ·
√
dB − 1
2
1√
dAdB
=
√
dA ·
√
1− 1
2dB
≥
√
dA ·
√
1− 1
dB
.
We now state two more standard results that can be used in place of Lemma 2.7.
First, we state a version of Le´vy’s lemma on the concentration of the rotation-invariant
measure on the sphere presented in [Milman and Schechtman 1986]. Note that this
is not the standard version of Le´vy’s lemma which uses the median instead of the
expectation.
LEMMA A.1 (LE´VY’S LEMMA). Let f : Cd → R and η > 0 be such that for all pure
states |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 in Cd,
|f(|ϕ1〉)− f(|ϕ2〉)| ≤ η‖|ϕ1〉 − |ϕ2〉‖2.
Let |ϕ〉 be a random pure state in dimension d. Then for all 0 ≤ δ,
P {|f(|ϕ〉)−E {f(ϕ)} | ≥ δ} ≤ 4 exp
(
−δ
2d
cη2
)
where c is a constant. We can take c = 18pi2.
PROOF. We can instead study the concentration of a Lipschitz function on the real
sphere S2d−1. Note that the induced function (that we also call f ) is still η-Lipschitz.
Concentration on S2d−1 can be proved in a simple way using concentration of the
standard Gaussian distribution. This proof is due to Maurey and Pisier and can be
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found in [Milman and Schechtman 1986, Appendix V]. Specifically, using [Milman and
Schechtman 1986, Corollary V.2], we get
P {|f(|ϕ〉)−E {f(|ϕ〉)} | ≥ δ} ≤ 2 exp
(
− δ
2(2d)
18pi2η2
)
+ 2 exp
(
− 2d
2pi2
)
≤ 4 exp
(
− δ
2d
9pi2η2
)
.
In the notation of the proof of [Milman and Schechtman 1986, Corollary V.2], we have
set δ = 1/(2
√
2). This can be done because using the same arguments as in the proof
of Lemma 2.6, we can show that the expected `2 norm of the standard real Gaussian
distribution in dimension 2d is at least
√
2
√
d− 12 >
√
d for d ≥ 2.
We used this version of Le´vy’s lemma because it has an elementary proof and it
gives directly the concentration about the expected value. Different versions involving
the median of f and giving better constants can be found in [Milman and Schechtman
1986, Corollary 2.3] or [Ledoux 2001, Proposition 1.3] for example.
The following lemma proves that the average of independent random variable
having sub-Gaussian tails is well-concentrated around its expectation. The proof uses
standard techniques for proving concentration inequalities.
LEMMA A.2. Let a, b ≥ 1, and t a positive integer. Suppose X is a random variable
with zero mean, satisfying the tail bounds for all η > 0
P {X ≥ η} ≤ ae−bη2 and P {X ≤ −η} ≤ ae−bη2 .
Let X1, . . . Xt be independent copies of X. Then if δ ≥ 0 and δ2b ≥ 16a2pi,
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
k=1
Xk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ
}
≤ exp
(
−δ
2bt
2
)
.
PROOF. For any λ > 0, using Markov’s inequality
P
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
= P
{
exp
(
λ
t∑
k=1
Xk
)
≥ exp (λtδ)
}
≤ E
{
exp
(
λ
t∑
k=1
Xk
)}
e−λtδ
= E
{
eλX
}t
e−λtδ.
Journal of the ACM, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:46
We now bound the moment generating function E
{
eλX
}
of X using the tail bounds.
E
{
eλX
}
=
∫ ∞
0
P
{
eλX ≥ u} du
=
∫ ∞
0
P
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du
=
∫ 1
0
P
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du+
∫ ∞
1
P
{
X ≥ lnu
λ
}
du
≤ 1 +
∫ ∞
1
a exp
(
−b ln
2 u
λ2
)
du
= 1 + a
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−bz
2
λ2
)
ezdz
by making the change of variable z = log u.
E
{
eλX
} ≤ 1 + a∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− b
λ2
(
z − λ
2
2b
)2
+
λ2
4b
)
dz
≤ 1 + a exp
(
λ2
4b
)∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− b
λ2
(
z − λ
2
2b
)2)
dz
= 1 + a exp
(
λ2
4b
)
λ√
2b
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−u
2
2
)
du
= 1 + a
√
2piλ√
2b
· exp
(
λ2
4b
)
≤ 2 max
(
1, a
√
piλ√
b
· exp
(
λ2
4b
))
.
We choose λ = 2δb (this is not the optimal choice but it makes expressions simpler),
P
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
≤ max
(
2t,
(
2a
√
piλ√
b
)t
· exp
(
λ2t
4b
))
exp (−λtδ)
= max
(
exp
(−2δ2bt+ t ln 2) , exp(δ2bt− 2δ2bt+ t ln(4a√piδ√b)))
= max
{
exp
((−2δ2b+ ln 2) t) , exp((−δ2b+ ln(4a√piδ√b)) t)} .
Claim. For all c ≥ 1 and x ≥ c
1
2
ln(cx)− x ≤ −x
2
.
The function x 7→ x2 − 12 ln(cx) is increasing for x ≥ 1. It suffices to show that it is
nonnegative for x = c. To see that, we differentiate the function y 7→ y− ln(y2) to prove
that for all y ≥ 1, we have y − ln(y2) ≥ 0. This proves the claim.
Using this inequality, we have for δ2b ≥ 16a2pi,
−δ2b+ ln(4a√piδ
√
b) ≤ −δ
2b
2
and − 2δ2b+ ln 2 ≤ −δ
2b
2
.
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Finally,
P
{
t∑
k=1
Xk ≥ tδ
}
≤ exp
(
−δ
2bt
2
)
.
B. EFFICIENT MUTUALLY UNBIASED BASES
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.10. We define V1 = 1 , and the remaining unitaries are
indexed by binary vectors u ∈ {0, 1}n, for example the binary representations of
integers from 0 to r − 2. The construction is based on operations in the finite field
F2n . The field F2n can be seen as an n-dimensional vector space over F2. Choose θ ∈ F2n
such that 1, θ, . . . , θn−1 form a basis of F2n . For any x, y ∈ [n], θx · θy ∈ F2n can be
decomposed in our chosen basis as θx · θy = ∑n−1`=0 m`(x, y)θ` for some m`(x, y) ∈ F2. We
can thus define the matrices M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1 from the multiplication table
1
θ
...
θn−1
 · ( 1 θ . . . θn−1 ) = M0 +M1θ + · · ·+Mn−1θn−1.
where M` = (m`(x, y))x,y∈[n]. For a given u ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the matrix
Nu =
n−1∑
`=0
u`M`.
Notice that as θx · θy = θx+y, the entry Nu(x, y) of Nu only depends on x + y, i.e.,
Nu(x, y) = Nu(x
′, y′) if x + y = x′ + y′. So we can represent this matrix by a vector
αu(x+ y) = Nu(x, y) of length 2n−1. We then define a Z4-valued quadratic form by: for
v ∈ {0, 1}n,
Tu(v) = v
TNuv mod 4.
Note that the operations vTNuv are not performed in F2 but rather in Z. Using the
vector αu, we can write
Tu(v) =
∑
x,y∈[n]
vxNu(x, y)vy mod 4 =
2n−2∑
z=0
(
z∑
x=0
vxvz−x
)
αu(z) mod 4
if we define vx = 0 for x ≥ n. We then define the diagonal matrixDu = diag
(
iTu(v)
)
v∈Fn2
.
Finally, we define for 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1,
Vj = Dbin(j−1)H⊗n
where bin(j) ∈ {0, 1}n is the binary representation of length n of the integer j.
The fact that these unitaries define mutually unbiased bases was proved in
[Wootters and Fields 1989]. We now analyse how fast these unitary transformations
can be implemented. Note that we want a circuit that takes as input a state |ψ〉
together with the index j of the unitary transformation and outputs Vj |ψ〉.
Given the index j as input, we show it is possible to compute u = bin(j − 1) and
compute the vector αj := αu in time O(n2 polylog n). In fact, we start by computing
a representation of the field F2n by finding an irreducible polynomial Q of degree n
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in F2[X], so that F2n = F2[X]/Q. This can be done in expected time O(n2 polylog n)
(Corollary 14.43 in the book [von zur Gathen and Gerhard 1999]). There also exists a
deterministic algorithm for finding an irreducible polynomial in time O(n4 polylog n)
[Shoup 1990]. We then take θ = X. Computing the polynomial Xx ·Xy = Xx+y mod Q
can be done in time O(n polylog n) using the fast Euclidean algorithm (see Corollary
11.8 in [von zur Gathen and Gerhard 1999]). As x + y ∈ [0, 2n − 2], we can explicitly
represent all the polynomials Xz for 0 ≤ z ≤ 2n − 2 in time O(n2 polylog n). It is then
simple to compute the vector αu using the vector u in time O(n2).
To build the quantum circuit, we first observe that applying a Hadamard transform
only takes n single-qubit Hadamard gates. Then, to design a circuit performing the
unitary transformation Dbin(j−1), we start by building a classical circuit that computes
Tu(v) =
2n−2∑
z=0
(
z∑
x=0
vxvz−x
)
αu(z) mod 4
on inputs v and αu. Observing that
∑z
x=0 vxvz−x is the coefficient of Y
z in the
polynomial
(∑n−1
x=0 vxY
x
)2
, we can use fast polynomial multiplication to compute Tu(v)
in time O(n polylog n) (Corollary 8.27 in [von zur Gathen and Gerhard 1999]). This
circuit can be transformed into a reversible circuit with the same size (up to some
multiplicative constant) that takes as input (v, αj , g) where v ∈ {0, 1}n, αj ∈ {0, 1}2n−1
and g ∈ Z4, and outputs (v, αj , g + Tu(v) mod 4).
This reversible classical circuit can be readily transformed into a quantum circuit
that computes the unitary transformation defined by W : |v〉|g〉 7→ |v〉|g+Tu(v) mod 4〉.
Recall that we want to implement the transformation Du : |v〉 7→ iTu(v)|v〉 efficiently.
This is simple to obtain using the quantum circuit for W . In fact, if we use a catalyst
state |φ〉 = |0〉 − i|1〉 − |2〉+ i|3〉, we have
W |v〉|φ〉 = iTu(v)|v〉|φ〉 = Dbin(j−1)|v〉|φ〉.
Finally, Dbin(j−1)H⊗n can be implemented by a quantum circuit of size
O(n polylog n).
C. PERMUTATION EXTRACTORS
In order to prove the existence of strong permutation extractors with good parameters,
we use the construction of Guruswami et al. [2009] which is inspired by list decoding.
Specifically we use their lossy condenser construction based on Reed-Solomon codes,
which can be transformed into a permutation condenser. Then we use their general
construction of an extractor based on the repeated application of a condenser. The
construction is described in this section. For completeness, we reproduce most of the
proof here, except the results that are used exactly as stated in [Guruswami et al.
2009].
It is also worth mentioning that to obtain metric uncertainty relations, we want
strong extractors. Even though Guruswami et al. [2009] mostly talk about weak
extractors in their presentation, it is simple to convert their extractors into strong
ones. In this section, we describe all the condensers and extractors as strong.
Definition C.1 (Condenser). A function C : {0, 1}n × S → {0, 1}n′ is an (n, k) →
(n′, k′) condenser if for every X with min-entropy at least k, C(X,US) is -close to a
distribution with min-entropy k′ when US is uniformly distributed on S. A condenser
Journal of the ACM, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:49
C is strong if (US , C(X,US)) is -close to (US , Z) for some random variable Z such that
for all y ∈ S, Z|US=y has min-entropy at least k.
A condenser is explicit if it is computable in polynomial time in n.
Remark. The set S is usually of the form {0, 1}d for some integer d. Here, it is
convenient to take sets S not of this form to obtain permutation extractors. Note also
that an extractor is an (n, k)→ (m,m) condenser.
Definition C.2 (Permutation condenser). A family {Py}y∈S of permutations of
{0, 1}n is an (n, k)→ (n′, k′) strong permutation condenser if the function PC : (x, y) 7→
PCy (x) where PCy (x) refers to the first n′ bits of Py(x) is an (n, k) → (n′, k′) strong
condenser.
A strong permutation condenser is explicit if for all y ∈ S, both Py and P−1y can be
computed in polynomial time.
The following theorem describes the condenser that will be used as a building block
in the extractor construction. It is an analogue of Theorem 7.2 in [Guruswami et al.
2009].
THEOREM C.3. For all positive integers n and ` ≤ n, as well as α,  ∈ (0, 1/2), there
exists an explicit family of permutations {RSy}y∈S of Fn2t that is an
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→ (`t, (1− α)`t− 4)
strong permutation condenser with t =
⌈
1/α · log(24n2/)⌉ and log |S| ≤ t. Moreover, the
functions (x, y) 7→ RSy(x) and (x, y) 7→ RS−1y (x) can be computed by a circuit of size
O(n polylog(n/)).
Remark. Note that the input space of the condenser is {0, 1}nt instead of {0, 1}n.
But one can see such a condenser as a permutation condenser (P ′y) on the smaller
space {0, 1}n defined by P ′y(x) = Py(x0t) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n where x0t is obtained by
appending t zeros to x.
PROOF. Set q = 2t and 0 = /6. Consider the function C ′ : Fnq × Fq → F`+1q defined
by
C ′(f, y) = [y, f(y), f(ζy), . . . , f(ζ`−1y)]
where Fnq is interpreted as the set of polynomials over Fq of degree at most n− 1 and ζ
is a generator of the multiplicative group F∗q . First, we compute the input and output
sizes in terms of bits. The inputs can be described using log |Fnq | = n log q = nt bits, the
seed using log |Fq| = t bits and the output using log |F`+1q | = (` + 1)t. Using Theorem
7.1 in [Guruswami et al. 2009], for any integer h, C ′ is a(
nt, log
(
q` − 1
0
))
→20
(
`t+ t, log
(
Ah` − 1
20
))
(37)
condenser whereA := 0q−(n−1)(h−1)`. We now choose h =
⌈
q1−α
⌉
. As q ≥ (4n2/0)1/α,
we have A ≥ 0q − n2h ≥ 0q − 0qα/4 · (q1−α + 1) ≥ 0q/2. Thus, we can compute the
bounds we obtain on the condenser C ′:
log
(
q` − 1
0
)
= `t+ log(1/0) ≤ (`+ 1)t
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and
log
(
Ah` − 1
20
)
= log
(
Ah`
20
)
+ log
(
1− 1
Ah`
)
≥ log(q/4) + ` log h− 1
≥ t+ (1− α)`t− 3.
Plugging these values in equation (37), we get that C ′ is a
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→20 (`t+ t, (1− α)`t+ t− 3)) (38)
condenser.
Observe that the seed y is part of the output of the condenser. As we want to
construct a strong condenser, we do not consider the seed as part of the output of
the condenser. For this, we define C : Fnq × Fq → F`q by C(f, y) = [f(y), . . . , f(ζ`−1y)].
Moreover, as will be clear later when we try to build a permutation condenser, we take
the seed to be uniform on S := F∗q instead of being uniform on the whole field Fq. Note
that this increases the error of the condenser by at most 2−t ≤ 0 (because one can
choose UF∗q = UFq with probability 1 − 2−t). Here and in the rest of this proof, we will
be using Doeblin’s coupling lemma.
Equation (38) then implies that if X has min-entropy at least (` + 1)t and US is
uniform on S, then the distribution of (US , C(X,US)) is 30-close to a distribution with
min-entropy at least (1−α)`t+t−3. Let Y ∈ S and Z ∈ {0, 1}(`+1)t be random variables
such that Hmin(Y,Z) ≥ (1 − α)`t + t − 3 and (US , C(X,US)) = (Y, Z) with probability
at least 1− 30. If Y was uniformly distributed on S, then it would follow directly that
for all y ∈ S, Hmin(Z|Y = y) ≥ (1 − α)`t. However, Y is not necessarily uniformly
distributed. We define a new random variable Z ′ by
Z ′ =
{
Z if Y = US
U ′ if Y 6= US
where U ′ is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}(`+1)t and independent of all the other
random variables. We have for any z ∈ {0, 1}(`+1)t and y ∈ S,
P {Z ′ = z|US = y} = 1
P {US = y} (P {Z
′ = z, Y = y, Y = US}+P {Z ′ = z, US = y, Y 6= Us})
≤ 1
P {US = y}
(
2−(1−α)`t−t+3 + 2−(`+1)t · 1|S|
)
≤ 2 · 2−(1−α)`t+3.
Moreover, we have (US , C(X,US)) = (US , Z ′) with probability at least 1− 60.
We conclude that C is a
(nt, (`+ 1)t)→ (`t, (1− α)`t− 4)) (39)
strong condenser.
To define our permutation condenser, we set the first n′ = `t bits RSCy (x) of
RSy(x) to be RSCy (x) = C(x, y). We then define the remaining bits by defining
RSRy (f) = [f(ζ
`y), . . . , f(ζn−1y)]. As q ≥ n − 1 and ζ is a generator of F∗q , the elements
y, ζy, . . . , ζn−1y are distinct provided y 6= 0. So for y 6= 0, (RSC , RSR)y(f) is the
evaluation of the polynomial f of degree at most n − 1 in n distinct points. Thus,
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f 7→ Py(f) is a bijection in Fnq for all y 6= 0. This is why the value 0 for the seed
was excluded earlier.
Concerning the computation of the functions RSCy and RSRy , they only require the
evaluation of a polynomial on elements of the finite field Fq. Computations in the
finite field Fq can be performed efficiently by finding an irreducible polynomial of
degree log q over F2 and doing computations modulo this polynomial. In fact, finding
an irreducible polynomial of degree log q over F2 can be done in time polynomial in log q
(see for example [Shoup 1990] for a deterministic algorithm and Corollary 14.43 in the
book [von zur Gathen and Gerhard 1999] for a simpler randomized algorithm). Since
addition, multiplication and finding the greatest common divisor of polynomials in
F2[X] can be done using a number of operations in F2 that is polynomial in the degrees,
we conclude that computations in Fq can be implemented in time O(polylog(n/)).
Moreover, one can efficiently find a generator ζ of the group F∗q . For example, Theorem
1.1 in [Shoup 1992] shows the existence of a deterministic algorithm having a runtime
O(poly(log(q))) = O(polylog(n/)).
To evaluate RSy at a polynomial f , we compute the field elements y, ζy, . . . , ζn−1y,
and then evaluate the polynomial f on these points. Using a fast multipoint evaluation,
this step can be done in O(n polylog n) number of operations in Fq (see Corollary 10.8
in [von zur Gathen and Gerhard 1999]). Moreover, given a list [f(y), . . . , f(ζn−1y)] for
y 6= 0, we can find f by fast interpolation in Fq[X] (see Corollary 10.12 in [von zur
Gathen and Gerhard 1999]). As a result RS−1y can also be computed in O(npolylog n)
operations in Fq.
This condenser will be composed with other extractors, the following lemma shows
how to compose condensers.
LEMMA C.4 (COMPOSITION OF STRONG PERMUTATION CONDENSERS). Let
(P1,y1)y1∈S1 be an (n, k)→ (n′, k′) strong permutation condenser and (P2,y2)y2∈S2 be an
(n′, k′) → (n′′, k′′) strong permutation condenser. Then (Py)y=(y1,y2)∈S1×S2 = (PCy , PRy )
where PCy1y2 = P
C
2,y2 ◦ PC1,y1 and PRy1y2 = (PR2,y2 ◦ PC1,y1) · PR1,y1 is an (n, k) →2 (n′′, k′′)
strong permutation extractor.
PROOF. Py is clearly a permutation of {0, 1}n. We only need to check that
PC is a strong condenser. By definition, if Hmin(X) ≥ k, (US1 , PC1,US1 (X)) is -
close to (US1 , Z) where Z|US1=y1 has min-entropy at least k′. Now putting Z
into the condenser PC2 , we get that for any y1, (US2 , PC2,US2 (ZUS1 ) is -close to
(US2 , Z2) where Z2|US2=y2 has min-entropy at least k′′ for any y2 ∈ S2. Thus,
Z2|US1US2=y1y2 has min-entropy at least k′′. Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we
have ∆
(
(US1 , US2 , P
C
US1US2
(X)), (US1 , US2 , Z2)
)
≤ 2.
Next, we present one of the standard extractors that are used as a building block in
many constructions.
LEMMA C.5 (“LEFTOVER HASH LEMMA” [IMPAGLIAZZO ET AL. 1989]). For all
positive integers n and k ≤ n, and  > 0, there exists an explicit family (Py)y∈S
of permutations of {0, 1}n that is an (n, k) → m strong permutation extractor with
log |S| = log(2n − 1) and m ≥ k − 2 log(2/).
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PROOF. We view {0, 1}n as the finite field F2n and the set S = F∗2n . We then define
the permutation Py(x) = x · y where the product x · y is taken in the field F2n . The
family of functions Py is pairwise independent. Applying the Leftover Hash Lemma
[Impagliazzo et al. 1989], we get that if Y uniform on F2n , the distribution of the first
dk − 2 log(1/)e bits of PY (X) together with Y is -close to uniform. Now if US is only
uniform on F∗2n , (US , PUS (X)) is  + 2−n-close to the uniform distribution. The result
follows from the fact that we can suppose  ≥ 2−n (otherwise, k− 2 log(1/) ≤ 0 and the
theorem is true).
The problem with this extractor is that it uses a seed that is as long as the input.
Next, we introduce the notion of a block source.
Definition C.6 (Block source). X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xs) is a (k1, k2, . . . , ks) block source
if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and x1, . . . , xi−1, X|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1 is a ki-source. When
k1 = · · · = ks = k, we call X a s× k source.
A block source has more structure than a general source. However, for a source of
large min-entropy k (or equivalently with small entropy deficiency ∆ = n−k), one does
not lose too much entropy by viewing a general source as a block source where each
block has entropy deficiency roughly ∆. See [Guruswami et al. 2009, Corollary 5.9] for
a precise statement.
LEMMA C.7 (LEMMA 5.4 IN [GURUSWAMI ET AL. 2009]). Let s be a (constant)
positive integer. For all positive integers n and ` ≤ n and all  > 0, setting t =⌈
8s log(24n2 · (4s+ 1)/)⌉, there is an explicit family {Ly}y∈S of permutations of {0, 1}n
that is an
(n, 2`t)→ `t
strong permutation extractor with log |S| ≤ 2`t/s+ t.
PROOF. As the extractor is composed of many building blocks, each generating some
error, we define 0 = /(4s + 1) where  is the target error of the final extractor. The
idea is to first apply the condenser RS of Theorem C.3 with α = 18s to obtain a string
X ′ = C(X,UF∗
2t
) of length n′ = (2`− 1)t which is 0-close to a k′-source where
k′ =
(
1− 1
8s
)
(2`− 1)t− 4
The entropy deficiency ∆ of this k′-source can be bounded by ∆ = n′ − k′ ≤ (2`−1)t8s + 4.
Then, we partition X ′ = (X ′1, . . . , X ′2s) (arbitrarily) into 2s blocks of size n′′ = bn′/2sc
or n′′ + 1 . Using [Guruswami et al. 2009, Corollary 5.9], (X ′1, . . . , X ′2s) is 2s0-close to
some 2s× k′′-source where k′′ = (n′′ −∆− log(1/0)).
We have ∆ ≤ `t/(4s) + 3 ≤ `t/(3s) for n large enough. Thus,
k′′ ≥ 2`t
2s
− `t
3s
− log(1/0) = 2
3s
`t− log(1/0).
We can then apply the extractor Lemma C.5 to all the 2s blocks using the same seed of
size n′′ + 1. Note that we can reuse the same seed because we have a strong extractor
and the seed is independent of all the blocks. This extractor extracts almost all the min-
entropy of the sources. More precisely, if we input to this extractor a 2s × k′′-source,
the output distribution is 2s0-close to m uniform bits where
m ≥ 2s · (k′′ − 2 log(2/0)) ≥ 4
3
`t− 6s log(2/0) ≥ `t.
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Overall, the output of this extractor is 0 + 2s0 + 2s0 = -close to the uniform
distribution on m bits.
It only remains to show that the extractor we just described is strong and can be
extended to a permutation. This follows from Lemma C.4 and the fact the condensers
(coming from Theorem C.3 and Lemma C.5) are strong permutation condensers.
Remark. As pointed out in [Guruswami et al. 2009], a stronger version of this
lemma (i.e., with larger output) can be proved by using the condenser of Theorem
C.3 and the high min-entropy extractor in [Goldreich and Wigderson 1997] with a
Ramanujan expander (for example, the expander of [Lubotzky et al. 1988]). This
construction can also give a strong permutation extractor. However, using this
extractor would slightly complicate the exposition and does not really influence the
final extractor construction presented in Theorem 2.14.
The following lemma basically says that the entropy is conserved by a permutation
extractor. It is an adapted version of [Raz et al. 1999, Lemma 26].
LEMMA C.8. Let {Py}y∈S be a (n, k)→ m strong permutation extractor. Let X be a
k-source, then (US , PEUS (X), P
R
US
(X)) is 2-close to (U ′S , U ′{0,1}m ,W ) where U
′
S and U ′{0,1}m
are independent and uniformly distributed over S and {0, 1}m respectively, and for all
y ∈ S, z ∈ {0, 1}m
Hmin(W |(U ′S , U ′{0,1}m) = (y, z)) ≥ k −m− 1.
PROOF. As {PEy } is a strong extractor, there exist random variables U ′S and U ′{0,1}m
uniformly distributed on S and {0, 1}m such thatP
{
(US , P
E
US
(X)) 6= (U ′S , U ′{0,1}m)
}
≤ .
Define Γ = {(y, z) ∈ S×{0, 1}m : P{PEy (X) = z} < 12 ·2−m}. We have for every (y, z) /∈ Γ
and x ∈ {0, 1}n−m,
P
{
PRy (X) = x|PEy (X) = z
} ≤ P{PRy (X) = x, PEy (X) = z}
2−m−1
≤ 2m+1P{X = P−1y (x, z)}
≤ 2−(k−m−1).
We then show that P
{
(US , P
E
US
) ∈ Γ} ≤ . Using the fact that {PEy } is a strong
extractor, we have ∣∣∣P{U ′S , U ′{0,1}m ∈ Γ}−P{(US , PEUS ) ∈ Γ}∣∣∣ ≤ .
But recall that, by definition of Γ, P
{
(US , P
E
US
) ∈ Γ} < 12P{US , U{0,1}m ∈ Γ}, so we get
P
{
(US , P
E
US ) ∈ Γ
} ≤ .
Finally we define
W =
{
PRUS (X) if (US , P
E
US
(X)) /∈ Γ
U∗ if (US , PEUS (X)) ∈ Γ
where U∗ is uniform on {0, 1}n−m and independent of all other random variables. We
conclude by observing that with probability at least 1 − 2, we have (US , PEUS (X)) =
(U ′S , U
′
{0,1}m) and P
R
US
(X) = W .
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Fig. 4. The extractor Q is obtained by first applying the condenser of Theorem C.3 and decomposing the
output into two parts. The Leftover Hash Lemma extractor (Lemma C.7) is applied to the first half and its
output is used as a seed for the extractor {P (i−2)y } coming from the induction hypothesis.
We then combine these results to obtain the desired extractor. The proof of the
following theorem closely follows [Guruswami et al. 2009, Theorem 5.10] but using the
lossy condenser presented in Theorem C.3 and making small modifications to obtain a
permutation extractor.
THEOREM C.9. For all integers n ≥ 1, all  ∈ (0, 1/2), and all k ∈[
200
⌈
200 log(24n2/)
⌉
, n
]
there is an explicit (n, k) → bk/4c strong permutation
extractor {Py}y∈S with log |S| ≤ 200
⌈
200 log(24n2/)
⌉
. Moreover, the function (x, y) 7→
Py(x) can be computed by circuit of size O(n polylog(n/)).
PROOF. If n ≤ 2 · 106, we can use the extractor of Lemma C.7 with s = 200 and
` ≥ 1 such that 2`t ≤ k ≤ 2(` + 1)t. This gives an extractor whose seed has size
k
200 ≤ 104 ≤ 200
⌈
200 log(24n2/)
⌉
and that extracts `t ≥ 14 · 2(` + 1)t ≥ k4 bits, so the
statement still holds true. In the rest of the proof, we assume n > 2 · 106.
The idea of the construction is to build for an integer i ≥ 0 an explicit (n, 2i · 8d) →
2i−1 · 8d using d bits of seed by induction on i. Fix t() = ⌈200 log(24n2/)⌉ and
d() = 200t(). The induction hypothesis for an integer i ≥ 0 is as follows: For all
integers i′ ≤ i and n and  > 0, there is an explicit
(n, 2i
′ · 8d())→ 2i′−1 · 8d()
strong permutation extractor with seed size d(). This extractor is called {P (i)y }y∈Si .
For both i = 0 and i = 1, we can use the extractor of Lemma C.7 with s = 20. For
i ∈ {0, 1}, this gives an extractor with seed 2i·8d(/81)20 +t ≤ 1620d()+ 1620200 d200 log(81)e ≤
d().
We now show for i ≥ 2 how to build the extractor {P (i)y } using the extractors {P (i
′)
y }
for i′ < i. Using the induction hypothesis, we construct the following extractor, which
will be applied four times to extract the necessary random bits to prove the induction
step. The choice of the form of the min-entropy values will become clear later. Set
0 = /20.
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Fig. 5. The permutation extractor {Qy} described in the claim is applied four times with independent seeds
in order to extract 2i−1 · 8d() random bits.
Claim. There exists an
(n, 2i · 4.5d(0))→50 2i · d(0)
strong permutation extractor {Qy}y∈T with seed size log |T | ≤ d(0)8 .
To prove the claim, we start by applying the condenser of Theorem C.3 with α = 1/200
and  = 0 (so we use a seed of size t(0)). The output X ′ of size at most 2i · 4.5d(0) is
then 0-close to having min-entropy is at least (1 − α)2i · 4.5d(0) − t(0). The entropy
deficiency of this distribution is α2i · 4.5d(0) + d(0)200 ≤ 2
i·4.5d(0)
100 . We then divide X
′ into
two equal blocks X ′ = (X ′1, X ′2), and we know that it is 20 close to being a 2×k′-source
for
k′ =
2i · 4.5d(0)
2
− 2
i · 4.5d(0)
100
− log(1/0) ≥
(
49
100
· 2i · 4.5− 1
200
)
d(0)
as log(1/0) ≤ t(0) = d(0)200 . For the extractors we will apply next to this source, we
should note that k′ ≥ 2d(0) and that 2i · 4d(0) ≤ k′ < 2i · 8d(0).
We now apply the extractor of Lemma C.7 to X ′1 (viewed as a 2d(0)-source) using a
seed of size 2d(0)20 and obtaining X
′′ that is 0 close to uniform on d(0) bits. We then use
the extractor {P (i−2)y } obtained by induction for i− 2 to the X ′2 (of size 2i · 4.5d(0) ≤ n)
with seed X ′′ (of size d(0)): it is an (n, 2i−2 ·8d(0))→0 2i ·d(0) permutation extractor.
The construction is illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the number of bits of the seed
is log |T | ≤ t(0) + 2d(0)20 ≤ d(0)8 . This concludes the proof of the claim.
The source X we begin with is a 2i · 8d()-source. But we have 2i · 8d() ≥ 2i · 8d(0)−
2i · 8 · 2002 log 20 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0) so that we can apply the permutation extractor (Qy)y∈T
of the claim. We obtain QEUT (X) which is 0-close to 2
i · d(0) random bits. As QE is part
of a permutation extractor, the remaining entropy is not lost: it is in QRUT (X). More
precisely, applying Lemma C.8, we get QRUT (X) is 0-close to a source of min-entropy at
least 2i · 8d()− 2i · d(0)− 1. As 2i · 8d()− 2i · d(0)− 1 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0), we can apply the
extractor (Q)y∈T of the claim to this source. Note that the input size has decreased but
as mentioned earlier this only makes it easier to extract random bits as one can always
encode in part of the input space. To apply Q, we use a fresh new seed that outputs a
bit string that is close to uniform on 2i−3 · 8d(0) bits and the remaining entropy can
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be found in the R register. We apply this procedure four times in total as shown in
Figure 5. Note that the reason we can apply it four times is that at the last application
2i · 8d()− 3 · 2i−3 · 8d(0)− 3 ≥ 2i · 4.5d(0). As the extractor (Qy)y∈T has error at most
50, the total error is bounded by 200 = .
We thus obtain an
(n, 2i · 8d())→ 4 · 2i−3 · 8d(0)
strong permutation extractor with seed set S = T 4 so that log |S| ≤ 4 · d(0)8 ≤ d().
By a repeated application of the previous theorem, we can extract a larger fraction
of the min-entropy.
THEOREM 2.14. For all (constant) δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists c > 0, such that for all
positive integers n, all k ∈ [c log(n/), n], and all  ∈ (0, 1/2), there is an explicit
(n, k) → (1 − δ)k strong permutation extractor {Py}y∈S with log |S| = O(log(n/)).
Moreover, the functions (x, y) 7→ Py(x) and (x, y) 7→ P−1y (x) can be computed by circuits
of size O(n polylog(n/)).
PROOF. We start by applying the extractor of Theorem C.9. We extract part of the
min-entropy of the source and the remaining min-entropy is in the R system (Lemma
C.8). This min-enrtopy can be extracted using once again the extractor of Theorem C.9.
After O(log(1/δ)) applications of the extractor, we obtain the desired result.
D. IMPOSSIBILITY OF LOCKING USING PAULI OPERATORS
The objective of this section is to give an example of a construction that is not a locking
scheme to illustrate what is needed to obtain a locking scheme. The 2×2 Pauli matrices
are the four matrices {1 , σx, σz, iσxσz} where
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
For bit strings u, v ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the unitary operation σuxσvz on
(
C2
)⊗n by
σuxσ
v
z = σ
u1
x σ
v1
z ⊗ · · · ⊗ σunx σvnz .
It was shown in [Ambainis et al. 2000] that one can encrypt an n-qubits state |ψ〉
perfectly using a key (U, V ) of 2n bits. To encrypt |ψ〉, one simply applies σUx σVz to |ψ〉.
This can be thought of as a quantum version of one-time pad encryption. Of course,
this encryption scheme also defines a (0, 0)-locking scheme, but the size of the key is
2n bits. Recall that we want to use the assumption that the message is random to
reduce the key size to O(polylog(n)) bits.
Ambainis and Smith [2004] showed that to achieve approximate encryption, it is
sufficient to choose the key uniformly at random from a subset S ⊆ {0, 1}2n of size
only O(n22n). Such pseudorandom subsets are called δ-biased sets and have also been
used to construct entropically secure encryption schemes [Dodis and Smith 2005;
Desrosiers and Dupuis 2010]. For example, Desrosiers and Dupuis [2010] showed that
it is possible to encrypt a uniformly random state by applying σUx σVz where (U, V ) is
chosen uniformly from a set S ⊂ {0, 1}n of size O(n2) (see [Dodis and Smith 2005;
Desrosiers and Dupuis 2010] for a precise definition of entropic security). Such a
scheme can seem like a good candidate for a locking scheme. The following proposition
shows that this encyption scheme is far from being -locking. Note that this also shows
that the notion of entropic security defined in [Desrosiers 2009; Desrosiers and Dupuis
2010] is weaker than the definition of locking.
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PROPOSITION D.1. Consider an -locking scheme E of the form E(x, k = (u, v)) =
σuxσ
v
z |x〉 where the message x ∈ {0, 1}n and the key u, v ∈ {0, 1}n (see Definition
3.1). Suppose the secret key K is chosen uniformly from a set S ⊆ {0, 1}2n. Then
|S| ≥ (1− )2n.
PROOF. Let X be the message (X is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n) and (U, V )
be the key. The key is uniformly distributed on S. We show that a measurement in
the computational basis gives a lot of information about X . Let I be the outcome of
measuring E(X,K) in the computational basis. We have for x, i ∈ {0, 1}n,
P {X = x|I = i} = P {I = i|X = x}
=
1
|S|
∑
(u,v)∈S
|〈i|σuxσvz |x〉|2 .
Observing that the term |〈i|σuxσvz |x〉|2 ∈ {0, 1}, we have that for any fixed i, there
are at most |S| different values of x for which P {X = x|I = i} > 0. Thus, defining
T = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : P {X = x|I = i} = 0}, we have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≥ P {X ∈ T} −P {X ∈ T |I = i} = |T |
2n
= 1− |S|
2n
.
By the definition of a locking scheme, we should have
∆
(
pX|[I=i], pX
) ≤ 
which concludes the proof.
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